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system. Today’s military retirement system, however, still remains largely the same as 
then. Previous reform proposals attempted to alleviate the four primary criticisms of the 
retirement system: growing cost, inequity to those with fewer than 20 years of service, 
hindered force manning, and a lack of civilian comparability.  
Hybrid defined benefit plans called cash balance plans are increasing in 
popularity in the private sector and contain defined contribution aspects. These cash 
balance plans provide a more conservative approach to retirement by placing more of the 
risk on the employer. 
This thesis presents an alternative approach to retirement system modernization 
that addresses the four primary criticisms. By incorporating a cash balance system in lieu 
of a defined contribution component and maintaining an old age annuity, a plan is 
proposed that still provides comparable retirement income to today’s system. The 
proposed system provides a higher present value than the current system and a system 
that the Department of Defense proposed in March 2014 for any discount rate above 
 4.85 percent. The proposed alternative system requires lower outlays than the current 
system and provides higher undiscounted lifetime earnings than the current system. The 
alternative system proposed in this thesis offers a viable modernization alternative for 
military retirement. 
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Current projections show that, absent any change in laws, the United States 
federal debt will reach 100 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2038 
(Congressional Budget Office [CBO], 2013). As part of this figure, the Congressional 
Budget Office estimates that outlays from the Military Retirement Fund (MRF) will grow 
from $51.7 billion in constant year 2012 dollars (CY12$) to $59 billion (CY12$) by 2022 
(CBO, 2012). The Defense Business Board (DBB) stated that these increasing retirement 
costs make the current system “increasingly unaffordable” and will become unsustainable 
if not changed (Defense Business Board [DBB], 2011, p. 3). These nonpartisan estimates 
support the need to reduce costs in the federal government. In November 2013, the CBO 
proposed 103 options to Congress that could reduce budget deficits and slow the growth 
of the national debt. One of these options entailed reforming federal pensions, both 
civilian and military (CBO, 2013). Congress attempted to take a step in reform with the 
Bipartisan Budget Agreement (BBA) passed in December 2013, reducing military 
retirees’ cost of living adjustment (COLA) for inflation by one percent. Immediate public 
outcry from veterans groups, however, led to that reduction being repealed in February 
2014, only two months later (Klimas, 2014).   
This growing cost demonstrates the need to reform military retirement to a more 
affordable level, but doing it in a method that provides adequate and comparable 
compensation to the existing military retirement system. To this end, the president of the 
United States and Congress created the Military Compensation and Retirement 
Modernization Commission (MCRMC) as part of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2013. Congress tasked the commission to review military 
compensation and retirement systems, and then recommend avenues to modernize them. 
As written in the law, the modernization recommendations, due in May 2014, should 
preserve the all-volunteer force, provide for the quality of life of service members and 
their families, and achieve fiscal sustainability (National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2013). 
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In 2011, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated a two-year review of the 
current retirement system and provided its recommendations to the MCRMC in March 
2014. The DOD proposal outlined significant reforms that it believes best achieve the 
desired outcome of modernizing the retirement system while adhering to the 
congressional mandates. Additionally, the DOD proposal answered some of the criticisms 
of the existing system, most notably that a majority of service members do not receive 
any retirement compensation (DOD, 2014). 
Military retirement modernization continues to be a prominent topic at the highest 
levels of the federal government and DOD. In line with this trend, this thesis attempts to 
provide additional information to policy makers so that they may make informed 
decisions regarding retirement modernization. To achieve this objective, this thesis 
analyzes current trends and best practices in private-sector retirement compensation to 
incorporate them into a modern retirement model.   
B. RETIREMENT SYSTEM TYPES 
Retirement systems include two types of retirement pension plans: defined benefit 
plans and defined contribution plans. With defined benefit plans, the plan sponsor 
guarantees a specified benefit based on salary and years of service. Defined benefit plans 
generally provide a monthly benefit or annuity, but may also be distributed as a lump sum 
(General Accounting Office, 2002). In 2014, the military retirement system provides a 
defined monthly annuity and is considered a defined benefit system (Burrelli & Torreon, 
2014).  
With a defined contribution plan, the plan sponsor and employee periodically 
contribute to an investment account. This defined contribution account is subject to 
market returns (positive and negative) and does not provide a guaranteed benefit in 
retirement (General Accounting Office, 2002). 
This thesis proposes a modernization to the military retirement system, and then 
compares it to the military retirement system and an alternative system proposed by the 
Department of Defense. As such, these systems will be described as being a defined 
benefit or defined contribution system. 
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C. PURPOSE 
The objective of this research is to determine and then incorporate the best 
practices of civilian retirement compensation into a model for military retirement reform. 
The model attempts to leverage current private sector compensation approaches into a 
plan that satisfies the objective of bringing military retirement more in line with civilian 
compensation while still providing significant retirement compensation comparable to the 
current defined benefit system. Ultimately, this thesis proposes incorporating a cash 
balance defined benefit component into a modernized military retirement system 
alternative that balances aspects of civilian compensation with the unique requirements of 
military retirement. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question addressed in this thesis is: 
 Does a cash balance component provide a viable alternative for military 
retirement system reform? 
Additional questions investigated include the following: 
 What are the current trends and concerns observed in private sector 
retirement plans?  
 How does the alternative model compare to the current DOD proposal? 
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The current military retirement system provides retirement benefits for active-
duty service members, reserve component service members, disabled service members, 
and some surviving spouses of deceased retirees. While reserve, disability, and eligible 
survivor retirement benefits are important, they only accounted for approximately $1.45 
billion, $5.68 billion, and $3.76 billion, respectively, of the total $54.09 billion total 
program cost in fiscal year 2013 (FY2013) (Burrelli & Torreon, 2014). When combined, 
these three additional retirement entitlements represent only 20 percent of the total 
program cost. As such, this thesis focuses on active-duty non-disability retirement 
compensation because it represents a much larger proportion of total program cost. 
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Additionally, retirees receive nonmonetary benefits in the form of access to 
military exchanges and commissaries; medical care through TRICARE for Life; and 
morale, welfare, and recreation facilities (Burrelli & Torreon, 2014). These nonmonetary 
benefits also fall beyond the scope of this thesis. 
This thesis does not provide a manpower-based approach to analyze the effects on 
retention and force structure. It does utilize observed trends and desires in compensation 
timing, however, to provide a reasonable alternative model that achieves those goals. 
Any change to the military retirement system will incur an additional cost to 
implement the new system and require appropriation changes via Congress. This thesis 
does not investigate these necessary changes and their costs. 
Finally, this thesis assumes 100 percent grandfathering of current service 
members in the current system. The proposed alternative would give current members the 
option to switch to the new alternative, but would not make the switch mandatory. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
The alternative system proposed in this thesis was compared to the current 
military retirement system and a DOD-proposed modernization. To achieve 
comparability, the thesis used the same age and retirement demographics included in the 
analysis published in the DOD proposal. The contributions and payments for each system 
were converted into expected annual cash flows from military retirement until age 85. 
The systems were then compared using present value analysis. Chapter IV provides a 
detailed description of the proposed alternative system and the calculations performed. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH 
Chapter II describes the current military retirement system, its origin, and the 
major criticisms associated with it. 
Chapter III reviews major previous reform proposals, the current Department of 
Defense proposal, and current trends in private sector retirement compensation.  
 5 
Chapter IV describes the proposed alternative system and the methodology used 
to compare the alternative system to the current military retirement system and a DOD-
proposed modernization to the current system. 
Chapter V discusses the results of calculations from the model and compares them 
to the current system and the DOD proposal. The chapter also presents the sensitivity 
analysis conducted for this proposal. 
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II. OVERVIEW OF MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
This chapter offers a broad summary of the military retirement system. It reviews 
both 1) the evolution of the current system and 2) the stated objectives and functions of 
the system’s present design. The chapter also describes the three different retirement 
compensation formulas currently used to calculate benefits and presents some common 
criticisms levied against them. This information builds the foundation for reforming 
military retirement in a socially acceptable manner. The Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness’ Military Compensation Background Papers provided the 
historical information presented in this chapter. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The United States’ military retirement system began with the Act of February 28, 
1855, in which the Secretary of the Navy could remove officers from active duty due to 
being physically unfit or having questionable morality (Under Secretary of Defense, 
2011). In 1861, Congress approved the first formal retirement system for Army, Navy, 
and Marine Corps officers by establishing voluntary retirement for officers serving over 
40 years of service (YOS), and then expanded that to include the involuntary retirement 
of officers with 45 YOS or after reaching age 62 (Under Secretary of Defense, 2011). 
The benefits offered under the 1855 and 1861 retirement laws varied slightly by service, 
but they both established a retirement pay with a monetary value equal to “proper pay” 
(the only pay rate at the time) plus “four rations” (Under Secretary of Defense, 2011). 
The rations effectively gave pay increases for longevity of service in addition to the 
single pay rate (Under Secretary of Defense, 2011). 
The Act of February 14, 1885 initiated nondisability retirement for Army and 
Marine Corps enlisted personnel to bring parity with the officer corps and provide an 
instrument of force management (Under Secretary of Defense, 2011). This act allowed 
enlisted personnel to voluntarily retire after 30 YOS and provided a retirement pay of 75 
percent of active-duty pay plus an allowance in place of quarters (Under Secretary of 
Defense, 2011). Congress extended the 30 YOS retirement to Navy enlisted personnel in 
 8 
1899 and then consolidated the 30 YOS voluntary retirement for all branches’ enlisted 
personnel in 1907 (Under Secretary of Defense, 2011). Prior to 1885, the Army, Navy, 
and Marine Corps managed their forces through selected acceptance (or non-acceptance) 
of reenlistment contracts. (Under Secretary of Defense, 2011) 
The Act of August 29, 1916 (Under Secretary of Defense, 2011) created two 
major changes and long-standing effects for the military retirement system. First, the law 
initiated the “up-or-out selective promotion plan” in which officers who failed to promote 
by a specified age (associated with their rank) were involuntarily retired (Under Secretary 
of Defense, 2011). Second, Congress introduced a pay formula to determine retirement 
benefits. This formula established retirement benefits at 2.5 percent of final monthly 
basic pay for each year of service up to 30 YOS and not to exceed 75 percent. This 
formula stood until 1980 (Under Secretary of Defense, 2011). 
In 1946, Congress established an enduring aspect of the military retirement 
system: voluntary retirement for naval officers with 20 YOS. Congress took this action to 
reduce the number of officer accessions resulting from World War II, essentially creating 
a force management tool (Under Secretary of Defense, 2011). With the Army and Air 
Force Vitalization and Retirement Equalization Act of 1948, Congress extended this 
same benefit to Army and Air Force officers, effectively creating a uniform retirement 
system for officers of every branch of service (Under Secretary of Defense, 2011). From 
that point, officers with 20 YOS, 10 of which must be commissioned, could retire with 
2.5 percent of their final basic pay for each YOS. During this same period, Congress 
aligned the enlisted voluntary retirement pay formula with that of the officer ranks. 
(Under Secretary of Defense, 2011) 
In response to rising military retirement costs and future liabilities (Under 
Secretary of Defense, 2011), Congress, through the Department of Defense Authorization 
Act of 1981, implemented the first change to the military retirement system since 1948 
by altering the formula used to calculate retirement pay (Under Secretary of Defense, 




basic pay to the average of the highest three years of basic pay (Hi-3) (Under Secretary of 
Defense, 2011). This new formula remains in effect today and will be explained in further 
detail later in this chapter. 
This major reform also created the precedence of grandfathering. As stipulated in 
the law, any service member who served at the time of enactment fell under the previous 
final pay formula rather than the Hi-3 formula (Under Secretary of Defense, 2011). 
Congress adopted grandfathering to prevent negative effects on the retention of critical 
personnel and to keep faith with members who made career decisions based on the 
previous system (Under Secretary of Defense, 2011). 
B. MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM OBJECTIVES 
The DOD Office of the Actuary defines the purpose of the system. Doing so 
establishes a baseline from which to judge the effectiveness of the system in meeting its 
ultimate objectives. In the Valuation of the Military Retirement System—September 30, 
2011, the DOD Office of the Actuary (2013) sets the objective of the military retirement 
system as,  
The principal motivations guiding the nondisability retired pay evolution 
of the Military Retirement System have been to ensure that (1) continued 
service in the armed forces is competitive with the alternatives; (2) 
promotion opportunities are kept open for young and able members; (3) 
some measure of economic security is made available to members after 
retirement from a military career; (4) a pool of experienced personnel is 
available for recall in times of war or national emergency. (p. 50) 
The Military Compensation Background Papers go further to say that the retirement 
payments to members must also be “socially acceptable” during old age and “generally 
competitive with private-sector employers” (Under Secretary of Defense, 2011, p. 571). 
Thus, any proposed reform must take all of these factors into account, not just singular 
aspects such as cost reduction. 
C. CURRENT IMPLEMENTATION 
The nondisability active-duty retirement system provides retirees a lifetime 
defined benefit. Burrelli and Torreon (2014) explain that the retirement system contains a 
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20 YOS cliff-vesting point. Therefore, any service member, officer or enlisted, who 
serves 20 or more years on active duty automatically qualifies, or “vests,” in the 
retirement plan and becomes eligible for payouts immediately upon retiring. Any member 
leaving service prior to 20 YOS, however, does not vest in the retirement system. The 
payouts occur on a monthly basis, equivalent to an annuity. Additionally, the monthly 
payments are annually inflation-adjusted via a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) based 
on the consumer price index (CPI) (Burrelli & Torreon, 2014; Under Secretary of 
Defense, 2011). Thus, upon retirement, eligible service members receive a monthly, 
inflation-adjusted payment until their death. 
With the early age at which members generally join the military, most military 
service members retire at a relatively early age after vesting at the 20 YOS point. The 
average enlisted member retires at age 43 with 22 YOS. The average officer retires at age 
45 with almost 24 years of active-duty service (Burrelli & Torreon, 2014).  
The current military retirement system offers compensation benefits based on 
three different formulas for active-duty retirees, commonly known as Final Basic Pay, 
High Three (Hi-3), and Redux/Career Status Bonus (CSB).  
1. Final Basic Pay 
The Final Basic Pay formula applies to any service member who entered active-
duty service prior to September 8, 1980 (Burrelli & Torreon, 2014). Under this plan, the 
monthly retirement pay is calculated by multiplying the retiree’s final monthly basic pay 
by 2.5 percent, referred to as the “multiplier,” and the number of years served. In essence, 
the service member accrues a retirement benefit after 20 YOS at the rate of an additional 
2.5 percent per YOS. Thus, service members retiring at 20 YOS would receive 50 percent 
of their final monthly basic pay (2.5% x 20 YOS) for the rest of their life (Under 
Secretary of Defense, 2011). In 2014, those members on active duty who are eligible for 
the Final Basic Pay system have at least 33 YOS and are rapidly aging out of the system. 
The DOD expects the few remaining eligible members to retire by 2016 (Burrelli & 
Torreon, 2014). Consequently, this formula was not considered when analyzing future 
retirement systems.  
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2. Hi-3 
Through the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1981, Congress 
changed the retirement formula to use the average of the highest three years of basic pay 
instead of the final basic pay. All members entering service after September 8, 1980 are 
eligible for this plan (Burrelli & Torreon, 2014). This formula uses the same 
compensation formula as the Final Basic Pay formula with the noted exception. Thus, a 
member retiring under this plan at 20 YOS would receive 50 percent of the average of his 
highest three years (Hi-3) of basic pay. For members serving for 30 years, they would 
receive 75 percent (2.5% x 30 YOS) of the average of their Hi-3.   
Congress removed the 30 YOS cap in 2006 to allow members to continuing 
receiving a 2.5 percent credit per year of service beyond 30. Now, members serving 40 
years can receive 100 percent (2.5% x 40 YOS) of their final basic pay or Hi-3, 
depending upon the formula under which they are eligible (Burrelli & Torreon, 2014). 
Consequently, any members serving over 40 years can receive greater than 100 percent of 
their pay (Burrelli & Torreon, 2014; Under Secretary of Defense, 2011).   
3. Redux/Career Status Bonus  
In the Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986, Congress changed the retirement 
formula calculations again in response to criticisms that the military retirement system 
was too generous (Burrelli & Torreon, 2014). This new retirement system came to be 
known as “Redux.” At the time, any member entering service on or after August 1, 1986 
automatically fell under this plan. Redux established a two-tier retirement system, a 
reduced annuity until a normal retirement age of 62 and then a full annuity after age 62. 
The first tier mimicked the Hi-3 plan except that the member’s annuity is reduced by one 
percent per year for each year that total service is below 30 YOS (retirement still vests at 
20 YOS); this reduced annuity remains in effect until age 62. For example, a member 
serving 20 years would receive 40 percent of his or her Hi-3 (2.5% x 20 YOS – 1% x 10 




30 YOS – 1% x 0 YOS), the same as the traditional Hi-3 plan. Additionally, the cost-of-
living adjustment is set at CPI minus one under Redux (Under Secretary of Defense, 
2011).   
The second tier begins after age 62. In this tier, the multiplier reverts to the same 
as the Hi-3 system. Thus, the 40 percent of Hi-3 monthly pay for members with 20 YOS 
increases to 50 percent of Hi-3 monthly pay in a one-time catch-up adjustment. This is an 
increase in monthly pay as opposed to a lump-sum payment (Burrelli & Torreon, 2014; 
Under Secretary of Defense, 2011).  
Due to its negative effects on recruitment and retention (Under Secretary of 
Defense, 2011), Congress changed the mandatory Redux system in 1999, through the 
National Defense Authorization Act of 2000. The Redux system became an optional 
choice rather than a mandatory one for military members. Members could revert to the 
previous Hi-3 system or remain with the Redux system. If a member chose the Redux 
system, Congress added a Career Status Bonus (CSB) of $30,000 to be paid at 15 YOS to 
offset the lower multiplier. The member must serve an additional five years to complete 
the full 20 YOS (Burrelli & Torreon, 2014; Under Secretary of Defense, 2011).  
In its current form, the Redux/CSB system uses the lower multiplier to calculate 
monthly pay until age 62 and also pays the CSB at 15 YOS. According to Burrelli and 
Torreon (2014), only 14,605 of the 1,904,310 total military retirees used this system as of 
September 2009, representing only 0.77 percent of the total retirees. Consequently, the 
REDUX option was not analyzed in this thesis. Table 1 provides a summary of the three 
current options used in the military retirement system. 
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Table 1.   Military Retirement System Options 
(from Under Secretary of Defense, 2011, p. 594) 
 
 






entering from September 
8, 1980 through July 31, 
1986 and persons 
entering after July 31, 
1986 but opting not to 
accept the 15-year 
Career Status Bonus
Service members 
entering after July 31, 
1986 and accepting a 15-
year Career Status 




Final rate of monthly 
basic pay
Average monthly basic 
pay for the highest 36 
months of basic pay
Average monthly basic 
pay for the highest 36 
months of basic pay
Multiplier 2.5% per year of service 2.5% per year of service
2.5% per year of service 
less 1% for each year of 
service less than 30 




Full CPI Full CPI
CPI less 1% with one-
time catch up at age 62, 




$30,000 Career Status 
Bonus payable at the 15-
year anniversary with 
assumption of 5-year 
obligation to remain on 
active duty
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D. CRITICISMS OF CURRENT SYSTEM 
Critics of the military retirement system point to four primary concerns when 
discussing the need to modernize the current system: the system’s cost to the government, 
inequity to those serving less than 20 years, force management inflexibility, and lack of 
civilian comparability (Henning, 2011). 
1. Cost 
The military retirement system’s cost provides the most obvious argument for 
reform. The Defense Business Board (DBB) (2011) describes the current retirement 
system as “increasingly unaffordable” and “unsustainable” with the present rising costs. 
The OSD Office of the Actuary forecasts the annual retirement payments to reach $116.9 
billion by 2035, up from $52.2 billion in 2011 (Defense Business Board, 2011). While 
these figures may not be adjusted for inflation, they still represent a 124 percent increase 
in less than 25 years. As such, these costs easily draw attention from those seeking 
reform. 
Critics cite two main reasons for the projected rising costs: increasing basic pay 
and COLA. As shown, base pay provides the basis for calculating monthly retirement 
payments. Future retirement payments grow proportionally to increases in basic pay. 
Henning  (2011) further describes that from 2002 to 2011, basic pay increased by 36.8 
percent, due primarily to offsets for inflation and recruitment during a decade of combat 
operations. During this same period, the CPI-based COLA increased by 21.7 percent 
(Henning, 2011).  
Additionally, longer life expectancy means service members receive payments for 
longer periods, which also increases cost (Defense Business Board, 2011). With the 
current formulas for calculating retirement benefits, these figures directly affect the 
forecasted increases in retirement liabilities. 
2. Equity 
Another commonly cited criticism concerns the perceived inequality and 
unfairness associated with the 20-year vesting requirement of the retirement system. 
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Henning (2011) explained that those members who serve up to 19 years do not receive 
any retirement benefit (excluding disability retirement), while those who serve 20 years 
or more receive the full retirement benefit. Only 17 percent of military members serve for 
20 years or more. Consequently, 83 percent of military members, including a majority of 
those engaging in combat, receive no retirement benefit for their service (Defense 
Business Board, 2011; Henning, 2011). O’Hanlon (2013) went as far as saying that the 
military retirement system is too generous for those vesting at 20 years and not generous 
enough for those leaving military service prior to vesting.   
3. Force Management 
According to Henning (2011), the primary goal of the military compensation 
system is “manning the force with the right number of personnel with the right skills and 
the right seniority” (p. 24). The retirement system lacks the flexibility to offer benefits to 
those serving less than 20 years and does not provide incentives that vary with “position, 
skill, or job description” (Henning, 2011, p. 24).   
With the inflexible nature of the retirement system, the 20-year cliff vesting point 
can negatively affect the services’ ability to manage their forces. The system’s “all or 
nothing” nature motivates personnel to stay long enough to vest, but then leave shortly 
thereafter. According to the DBB (2011), retention drops significantly within the first five 
years of vesting in the plan. DOD Office of the Actuary data show that 76 percent of 
military members reaching 20 YOS retire between 20 and 25 YOS (Defense Business 
Board, 2011).   
Additionally, service leadership finds it difficult to release members with at least 
15 YOS (Defense Business Board, 2011). Hudson and Buchalter (2007) explain this 
difficulty. The leadership knows the significant cost to the member if involuntarily 
separated prior to the 20-year vesting. Thus, commanding officers feel compelled to keep 
personnel who achieve a certain rank or YOS, as if they have an “implicit contract,” to 
avoid a negative effect on subordinates’ morale. The superiors only separate the absolute 
lowest performers. This creates a force based on surviving until 20 YOS rather than one 
based on job-determined requirements (Hudson & Buchalter, 2007). 
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4. Civilian Comparability 
The current military-defined benefit retirement plan lacks major aspects of most 
civilian retirement plans, most notably early vesting, portability, and choice. Henning 
(2011) explains that the military competes against the civilian sector for personnel. In the 
civilian sector, most employees vest at a much earlier time, and thus retain some 
retirement benefit, especially with 401(k)-style defined contribution plans. Subsequently, 
civilian employees can move their vested retirement plan benefits from employer to 
employer. Finally, civilians with defined contribution plans can normally choose how 
their plan manager invests their funds (Department of Defense, 2014; Henning, 2011). 
Thus, civilian retirement plans offer more options that provide employees flexibility in 
their careers. This characteristic of civilian retirement plans provides a hurdle for 
recruiting and retaining the right mix of military members. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The current military retirement system evolved from a force management tool 
providing junior personnel with upward mobility to a program that provides a socially 
acceptable livelihood for retirees. The objectives still remain rooted in maintaining 
opportunities for young and able members, but now also include aspects of providing 
retirees economic security and comparability to civilian alternatives. Depending on date 
of entry into military service, service members can fall under one of three different 
retirement plans: Final Basic Pay, Hi-3, and the optional Redux/CSB. Knowing the 
background and objectives of the military retirement system provides a context to assess 
the current system’s shortfalls and offers viable modernization alternatives. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review offers information on previous and current military 
retirement reform proposals from various panels and commissions. The review also 
provides information on current trends in private-sector retirement compensation 
practices. The information provided in the chapter describes the major aspects of each 
subject, but does not include an in-depth discourse on them. The intent of this chapter is 
to create an informed foundation to understand the challenges and requirements of 
modernizing the military retirement system and to describe the current approaches to 
private sector retirement. 
A. PREVIOUS MAJOR REFORM PROPOSALS 
Modern military retirement reform began with the 1948 Advisory Commission on 
Service Pay, commonly referred to as the Hook Commission (Christian, 2006). Since 
then, boards and commissions have studied military retirement system reform and 
modernization. This section looks at selected reform initiatives to understand their 
approach to altering the system and also to explain the source of DOD’s current 
retirement reform proposal’s components. These proposals contain a variety of changes 
that generally fall within eight categories. Hudson and Buchalter (2007) based these 
categories on a 1983 GAO report. The categories include: 
 Retirement Eligibility, or Years of Service and Age at which Nondisability 
Retirement Benefits are Payable 
 Formula for Retired Pay, or Cost-of-Living Adjustments 
 Contributory versus Noncontributory Retirement 
 Vesting of Retirement Benefits 
 Severance Pay 
 Integration with Social Security 
 Transitional and Save Pay 
 Adjustment Mechanism (p. 14) 
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These proposals also contain recommendations for involuntary nondisability, 
disability, and reserve component retirement. These aspects are not investigated in this 
thesis. 
1. 1948 Advisory Commission on Service Pay  
The 1948 Advisory Commission on Service Pay, commonly referred to as the 
Hook Commission, focused on overhauling the entire military compensation system 
(Christian, 2006). According to Christian, this commission instituted many reforms that 
endure today, most importantly the pay and allowances system. The commission also 
recommended reforms for the retirement system. With members being able to retire at 
approximately 42 years of age, they viewed the system as being too generous. 
Furthermore, they felt the 20-year vesting time did not provide equity to those members 
serving less than 20 years. Consequently, commission members proposed that retirement 
eligibility be set at 30 years of service (YOS) for any age or after 20 YOS if the member 
reaches age 60 (officers) or 50 (enlisted) prior to exiting military service. To combat the 
equity issue, the commission also recommended a set of severance payments for 
individuals involuntarily separated prior to 20 YOS. In addition, the concurrent Joint 
Army-Navy Pay Board recommended vesting at 10 YOS with the retirement annuity 
payable at age 62 (Christian, 2006). 
The Hook Commission also investigated a potential defined contribution 
component, but discounted the option for administrative reasons. They felt the cost of 
administering the retirement fund would outweigh the savings from it. (Christian, 2006)   
2. First Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation 
In 1969, the First Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) 
attempted to lower the cost of the military retirement system through two main 
approaches: establishing a two-tiered system and a contributory component (Christian, 
2006). The First QRMC stated most newly-retired military members would transition to a 
second career before becoming fully retired because of their relatively early average 
retirement age. Thus, it recommended a two-tier retirement annuity system (Christian, 
2006). According to the committee, the retiree would receive a lower annuity during the 
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first phase, concurrent with the retiree’s second career. Christian (2006) described the 
committee’s view that “all that was warranted was a benefit equal to the second-career 
earnings loss associated with transition to the civilian labor force” (p. 4). Once the retiree 
fully exited the labor force beginning at age 62, the second phase, or “old age” tier, began 
and increased the monthly retirement annuity. The proposed plan still vested at 20 YOS 
with a benefit equal to 24 percent of final basic pay during the second-career annuity. A 
member serving until 30 YOS would receive 51 percent of final basic pay. The old age 
phase increased the monthly annuity and varied from 33 percent of final basic pay for 20 
YOS to 75 percent for 40 YOS (Christian, 2006). 
The First QRMC also proposed including a contributory component to its plan. 
Christian (2006) wrote that the commission calculated that the current (at that time) 
noncontributory system artificially reduced service members’ pay by 6.5 percent. Thus, 
the First QRMC proposed a fully vested contributory element for career members that 
equated to 6.5 percent of annual pay (Christian, 2006).   
3. Interagency Committee on Uniformed Services Retirement and 
Survivor Benefits 
In 1971, the Interagency Committee on Uniformed Services Retirement and 
Survivor Benefits (IAC) convened to reduce the cost of the military retirement system 
(Christian, 2006). According to Christian, the IAC introduced a new alternative by 
proposing the military shift the basis of the retirement formula from final basic pay to the 
average of the highest three years of pay (Hi-3); the proposal was a new aspect of reform. 
The committee also recommended keeping the two-tier-style reform from the First 
QRMC, but with different benefit levels and “old age” payments beginning at age 60. To 
incentivize career continuation beyond 24 YOS, the full annuity multiplier would 
increase from 2.5 percent (below 24 YOS) to 3.0 percent for members serving between 




To mitigate the equity issue, the IAC also proposed a deferred annuity starting at 
age 60 for members serving between 10 and 19 YOS. In lieu of the annuity, members 
could also take an immediate lump-sum payment instead. The deferred annuity would be 
calculated at the 2.5 percent rate (Christian, 2006). 
4. Uniformed Services Retirement Modernization Act of 1974 
One of the Uniformed Services Retirement Modernization Act (RMA) of 1974’s 
stated objectives was to reduce the cost of the retirement system, provide equity to those 
serving less than 20 years, and aid as a force management tool, particularly in retaining 
members with 8 to 12 YOS. The RMA included a number of the recommendations from 
IAC, but it was never enacted into law (Christian, 2006). 
Christian (2006) explains the RMA’s three primary reform components. First, this 
legislation proposed using the average highest annual basic pay in the year prior to 
retiring (“high one”) as the basis for the benefits formula. Second, the RMA kept the two-
tiered approach, but offered a flat 15 percent reduction for the second-career annuity from 
the time of retirement until that member would have reached 30 YOS, when the full 
annuity would be restored. Thus, a member retiring at 20 YOS would receive a 35 
percent annuity for the ten years immediately following retirement and then receive the 
full 50 percent after ten years in retirement. Third, the RMA integrated Social Security 
with military retirement benefits. Instead of being additive as they were, the RMA offset 
military retirement benefits by “50 percent of the amount of the Social Security benefit 
attributable to military service” (Christian, 2006, p. 5).   
The RMA kept the 20-year vesting, but also included the 10 to 20 YOS deferred 
benefit annuity recommended by the IAC to provide some equity to those service 
members. It did not include the lump-sum payment option, however (Christian, 2006). 
5. Defense Manpower Commission 
In 1976, the Defense Manpower Commission (DMC) attempted to solve three 
familiar inadequacies attributed to the military retirement system: cost, equity, and force 
management (Hudson & Buchalter, 2007). According to Hudson and Buchalter (2007), 
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the commission also proposed recognizing the innate differences between combat 
operations and occupations involving administrative-type work. As such, the DMC 
proposed a shift in the benefit calculation to a points-based system. Members in a combat 
role earn 1.5 points per year while those in noncombat roles earn 1 point per year. The 
DMC defined retirement as achieving 30 points, which equated to serving between 20 
and 30 years. The retirement annuity, based on the Hi-3 formula, began at 30 YOS. The 
proposal also included a two-tier system, one for those earning between 10 and 30 points 
and another for those earning the full 30 points. The first tier, service members with 10 to 
20 YOS, created a deferred annuity, receivable at age 65, based on a formula of 2.66 
percent of Hi-3 multiplied by the number of accrued points. The second tier, for 20 to 30 
YOS, used the same calculation, but with benefits available at 30 YOS or at an earlier 
date for an actuarially-reduced annuity. Changes to the military retirement system did not 
result from the DMC report (Christian, 2006; Hudson & Buchalter, 2007). 
6. President’s Commission on Military Compensation 
The President’s Commission on Military Compensation (PCMC) convened in 
1978 to review the aforementioned retirement studies as well as findings from the DOD 
Retirement Study Group and a General Accounting Office report on military retirement 
(Hudson & Buchalter, 2007). According to Hudson and Buchalter (2007), the PCMC 
focused on three primary criticisms of the military retirement system: inequity to 
members serving less than 20 years, inflexible force management, and ineffectiveness to 
retain members after their first enlistment while simultaneously encouraging senior 
personnel to stay through 20 YOS. The commission’s recommendations called for a 
noncontributory retirement plan that included establishing a deferred compensation trust 
fund and a single-tier, old age annuity with partial integration of Social Security benefits 
(Hudson & Buchalter, 2007). 
The PCMC recommended a vesting point for an old age annuity at 10 YOS to 
provide equity to members not reaching 20 YOS. According to Hudson and Buchalter 
(2007), the commission viewed the old age annuity as a force management tool that 
competed well with civilian counterparts and provided incentives to continue through 35 
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YOS. The PCMC calculated that the proposed retirement plan’s effects on personnel 
would be to increase members with less than 10 YOS, decrease those with 10 to 20 YOS, 
and increase members with 21 or more YOS (Hudson & Buchalter, 2007). Tables 2 and 3 
summarize the recommended old age annuity eligibility and multiplier YOS gates.   
 
Table 2.   PCMC Eligibility for Retirement Annuity 
(from Hudson & Buchalter, 2007, p. 35) 
 
Table 3.   PCMC Annuity Multipliers 
(from Hudson & Buchalter, 2007, p. 35) 
In addition to the old age annuity, Christian (2006) wrote that the PCMC 
recommendation also called for establishing a deferred compensation trust fund for every 
member with at least 5 YOS. The government would contribute to the fund at varying 
rates depending on YOS, and the member would vest in their fund after 10 YOS. After 
vesting, the separating member would have the option to withdraw the fund balance via a 
lump-sum payment or rollover the balance into another retirement account. The deferred 
compensation fund encouraged retention in the mid-tenure range by offering higher 
contribution rates than at earlier years of service. This deferred compensation allowed 
some form of financial aid while transitioning to civilian life (Christian, 2006). Hudson 
and Buchalter’s (2007) report entitled A Summary of Major Military Retirement Reform 
Proposals: 1976–2006 provides a more in-depth analysis of the PCMC 
recommendations. 
Years of Active Service Completed Age at Which Annuity Begins
10-19 62
20-29 60
30 or more 55
Years of Service Per-Year Multipliers (percentage)
1 to 5 2.00
6 to 11 2.25
11 to 35 2.75
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The DOD took the PCMC recommendations and modified them to create the 
Uniformed Services Retirement Benefits Act (USRBA) of 1979 (Christian, 2006). 
According to Christian (2006), the USRBA eliminated the deferred compensation fund, 
but allowed service members to borrow against their expected annuities, up to a 
maximum value of 22 months of basic pay. This provided the optional transition pay 
option instead of the deferred compensation fund. Congress did not pass the USRBA, 
however, when the Treasury Department objected to the large near-term outlays expected 
from including a deferred compensation component (Christian, 2006). 
7. Fifth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation 
The Fifth QRMC, in 1982, focused its reform efforts on force management in a 
cost-reduction environment. As Hudson and Buchalter (2007) state, “the Fifth QRMC 
regarded force impact considerations, not cost avoidances alone, as foremost in 
evaluating retirement-system alternatives” (p. 48). Instead of recommending a single 
retirement plan, the Fifth QRMC offered four alternatives. The vesting period stayed at 
20 YOS because the commission stated that the current severance and enlisted bonus pay 
structure offered elements of equity. Each alternative included an early withdrawal 
component after reaching retirement eligibility (20 YOS) that equated to a low-rate, 
interest-only loan (Hudson & Buchalter, 2007). In addition to the early withdrawal 
component, the Fifth QRMC proposed four separate alternatives: 
 A reduced multiplier of 1.75 percent 
 Reducing the COLA to 50 percent of CPI until age 62 
 A reduced early (pre-30 YOS) benefit rising from 35 percent of Hi-3 (20 
YOS) to 75 percent of Hi-3 (30 YOS) 
 A combination of 75 percent of COLA until age 62 and the proposed 
reduced early (pre-30 YOS) benefit (Hudson & Buchalter, 2007)   
The recommendation also discounted a contributory retirement system. The Fifth 
QRMC’s analysis showed that a contributory plan would cause a decline in enlisted 
career force strengths (Christian, 2006). 
 24 
8. Defense Advisory Commission on Military Compensation 
The Defense Advisory Commission on Military Compensation (DACMC) offered 
a holistic review of the military retirement compensation structure in 2006 that provided 
methods to improve the recruitment and retention of a “high-quality, cost-effective, ready 
military force” (Hudson & Buchalter, 2007, p. 60). In line with the previous reform 
proposals, the DACMC stated that the current retirement system was “inequitable, 
inefficient, and inflexible” due to the 20-year vesting, overly-deferred compensation, and 
force management restriction (Hudson & Buchalter, 2007, p. 61). While not offering a 
specific retirement plan alternative, the DACMC generated a number of approaches to 
counteract these deficiencies. The DACMC findings proposed an old age annuity 
beginning at age 60, an early-vesting defined contribution account, and “offsetting 
compensation” through various cash payments at specific YOS points (Hudson & 
Buchalter, 2007). 
According to Hudson and Buchalter (2007), the findings described a military 
force management culture that felt any member who reaches 10 to 12 YOS should be 
allowed the opportunity to retire because it is unfair not to do so. As evidence, the report 
noted that the second most frequent departure time from the military occurs at the 20 
YOS point, with the most frequent occurring after the initial four-year commitment. The 
DACMC also specified that the 20-vesting point incentivized members to only stay until 
20 YOS, even though the services’ best interest may be served by certain members 
continuing to serve (Hudson & Buchalter, 2007). 
The DACMC also concluded that the current system defers too much 
compensation via the immediate lifetime annuity (Hudson & Buchalter, 2007). Hudson 
and Buchalter (2007) explained that the commission sought to increase current 
compensation in lieu of the deferred compensation. The report argued that this switch 
offered two distinct benefits. First, the current compensation generated a lower cost to the 
government. The supporting calculations used an $87,500 lump-sum bonus paid to an 
enlisted member at 12 YOS, contingent on the member serving 20 years. Assuming the 
member had a 10 percent personal discount rate, the lump-sum provided the same 
financial incentive as the deferred annuity, but cost the government less than half that of 
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the annuity (Hudson & Buchalter, 2007). Second, the lump-sum satisfied members’ 
desires because individuals generally value current compensation more than deferred 
compensation. The report also noted that increasing retention through deferred 
compensation is normally more costly than using current compensation (Hudson & 
Buchalter, 2007). Table 4 summarizes the DACMC’s proposed architecture changes. 
 
Table 4.   DACMC Proposed Retirement Architecture 
(after Hudson & Buchalter, 2007) 
9. Defense Business Board 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates gave the Defense Business Board (DBB) a 
mandate in 2010 to identify options that would significantly reduce overhead and 
increase efficiency within the DOD’s business operations (DBB, 2011). As part of this 
mandate, the DBB (2011) investigated the military retirement system to develop potential 
retirement alternatives that would be fiscally sustainable, while at the same time 
recruiting and retaining the highest-performing members. The DBB focused on inequity 
to non-vested members, inflexibility in force shaping, and cost savings. In 2011, the DBB 
recommended discarding the current defined benefit plan and switching to a purely 
defined contribution plan, commonly seen in the private sector (DBB, 2011). 
The DBB (2011) provided the historical context for the current military retirement 
system and its recommendations in its report. As previously shown, the current system 
has not been altered to reflect the switch to the All-Volunteer Force. The DBB’s findings 
stated that “the system was designed in an era when life spans were shorter, draft era pay 
was substantially less than civilian sector pay, second careers were less common, and 
Old Age Annuity Defined Contribution Career Continuation Pay Transition Pay
Vesting 10 YOS 5 - 10 YOS Based on YOS milestone 10 YOS
Formula
Hi-3 with extension to 
40 YOS
Approximately 5% of 
basic pay




Comment Begins at age 60
Government 
contributions begin 
upon entrance to 
active duty
Key YOS milestones: 10, 




skills acquired during military service were not transferrable to the private sector” (DBB, 
2011, p. 2). The board also noted that the current military pay is now higher than the 
average pay for civilians with the same level of education. Both officer and enlisted pay 
ranked in the top quartile for college and high school graduates, respectively. Lastly, the 
DBB found that military retirement contributions amounted to approximately 10 times 
that of the private sector, with military contributions equating to 75 percent of annual pay 
as compared to a private sector pension with 4 to 12 percent annual contributions (DBB, 
2011). 
The DBB (2011) recommended switching to a defined contribution system that 
could easily use the existing federal defined contribution system, the Thrift Savings Plan 
(TSP), as a model from which to create the new plan. Like private sector plans, the 
payouts would begin between 60 and 65 years of age. While not specifically setting 
contribution amounts, the DBB’s (2011) recommended plan suggested various possible 
contribution rates that could be used to help shape the military force. For example, the 
military could increase the contribution in direct proportion to the member’s length of 
service or provide an increase at a specific retention gate. Additionally, the member could 
receive a higher contribution while deployed in a combat area or separated from family. 
By having an individual account that vested after a short period, the member could move 
it to the private sector at the end of service and then back if returning to military service. 
The DBB also recommended a transition payment, similar to private sector severance 
pay, which would offer some security for the member while establishing a second career 
(DBB, 2011). 
B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROPOSAL 
The previous section described a number of major reform initiatives that failed to 
create major change in the retirement system. The most significant change occurred with 
the Redux plan described in Chapter II. While that plan still exists, Congress essentially 
pushed it aside and reverted to the previous Hi-3 system (Under Secretary of Defense, 
2011). In its effort to present a plan that meets all objectives, the DOD conducted a two-
year study, beginning in 2011. The DOD offered its final proposal to the Military 
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Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission (MCRMC) in March of 2014 
(DOD, 2014). Like some previous proposals, this proposal provided reform options 
instead of a specific recommendation. This section focuses on the final DOD 
recommendations.  
1. Background 
The DOD study stated that “a more modern and efficient military retirement 
system may be devised that sustains the All-Volunteer Force, achieves savings, and 
provides beneficiaries with a lifetime retirement income comparable to today’s” (DOD, 
2014, p. 1). To achieve that outcome, the DOD established eight principles to guide the 
recommendation. These principles include: 
 Maintain force profile, recruiting and retention (including the ability to 
accommodate different future force profiles or recruiting and retention 
needs) 
 Balance interests of force managers, service members and the American 
taxpayers 
 Consider criticisms others have made of the current system 
 Carefully consider impacts on the service member and his or her family 
 Base any review/examination on rigorous analysis 
 Achieve savings 
 Improve total force management 
 Keep faith with serving members (fully “grandfather” currently 
serving members and current retirees/survivors) (Department of Defense, 
2014, p. 1) 
Additionally, the DOD (2014) stated the objectives of the proposed system: to 
simultaneously offer service members a strong retirement; to give force managers means 
to shape and maintain the force structure; and to provide a capable and cost-effective 
force (DOD, 2014). 
The DOD (2014) reviewed previous retirement reform proposals to assess the 
potential effectiveness of their components. The findings indicated that a full defined 
contribution plan, similar to the Defense Business Board proposal, would devastate 
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retention and place all retirement risk on the service member. The large increase in 
current income required to overcome this effect on retention made this plan unfeasible 
with regard to the objective of providing a cost-effective force. Next, the DOD 
discounted a reduction in COLA, citing the unacceptably high long-term impact on the 
financial well-being of a future retiree. Third, a lump-sum payment based on the present 
value of the current defined benefit plan was deemed too risky to the retiree, and the large 
size would be heavily scrutinized. Finally, the DOD disregarded a simple reduction in the 
multiplier as well as changing the basis of the benefit formula from Hi-3 to the average of 
the highest four or five years. These changes did not modernize the retirement system, 
only reduced its cost (DOD, 2014). 
2. Proposed Modernization 
To satisfy all of the intended objectives, the DOD (2014) recommended switching 
to a hybrid retirement plan that incorporates aspects of both defined contribution and 
defined benefit plans. As such, the DOD offered two separate, but similar, concepts to the 
MCRMC. Both concepts include a retirement annuity, defined contribution plan, career 
continuation pay, and a transition pay to help shift to a second career. The main 
difference with the two concepts lies with the retirement annuity, with one concept being 
a two-tier annuity and the second concept being a single-tier annuity. From here on, the 
two-tier annuity plan will be referred to as “Concept 1” and the single-tier annuity plan 
will be referred to as “Concept 2” (DOD, 2014). 
a. Defined Benefit 
Both proposed concepts retain the 20-year vesting point to qualify for the 
retirement annuity. Similar to the current system, the benefit formulas for both Concept 1 
and Concept 2 use Hi-3, a percentage multiplier factor, and YOS. Yet, both concepts 
reduce the overall annuity for the retiree. The plans intend for the defined contribution 
and other pay components to compensate for this lost annuity. Consequently, the DOD 
plans to shift deferred compensation to current compensation, in line with most 
individuals’ desires (DOD, 2014). 
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Concept 1 calls for the two-tier annuity plan that recognizes “the propensity for 
most military retirees to embark upon a second career or continued employment after 
military retirement” (DOD, 2014, p. 10). According to the DOD (2014), the two-tier 
system switches from the first tier to the second tier at age 65, approximately the age at 
which a retiree exits the labor force. The DOD determined that the most effective basis 
for the first tier would be the member’s full retirement multiplier. Thus, the first tier 
would use the 2.5 percent factor in the formula, but would cap the first tier at 25 percent 
of Hi-3. Through modeling and analysis, the DOD review found that this cap achieved 
the desired retention for the services. For an additional cost-saving alternative, the DOD 
also offered using a 2.0 percent multiplier factor. This factor capped the first tier at 16 
percent of Hi-3 (DOD, 2014). 
According to the DOD (2014), Concept 2 utilizes a single-tier plan, as in the 
current system, that begins annuity payments immediately upon retirement. The main 
difference from Concept 1 lies with a reduced percentage factor, thus reducing the 
lifetime annuity benefit. The DOD used 2.0 and 1.75 percent for the multiplier factor in 
its analysis (DOD, 2014). 
b. Defined Contribution 
Both Concept 1 and Concept 2 contain the same defined contribution component, 
specifically the TSP. The DOD (2014) wrote that each concept would automatically 
make mandatory contributions on behalf of the member, beginning after 2 YOS. An 
individual member would not need to make any contribution to receive DOD’s 
contributions. The DOD set the contribution rate at five percent of basic pay (DOD, 
2014). 
The DOD (2014) set the vesting point at six years and one day of service. Vesting 
at this time encourages service members to remain on active duty after completing their 
initial service obligation. Additionally, members serving between 6 and 20 years would 
now receive some benefit, instead of nothing under the current system. The DOD stated 
that this could aid in recruiting by making military service more attractive to those not  
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expecting to serve a full 20 years. Finally, the automatic contributions would end after the 
member completed 20 YOS because they would not be needed to maintain the desired 
force (DOD, 2014). 
c. Transition Pay 
The transition pay component amounts to a lump sum payment at the end of a 
service member’s career. The DOD (2014) stated that this aspect of the recommendation 
caters to the individual member’s preference for current compensation versus deferred 
compensation and increases the perceived value to the retiring member. Only those 
members serving at least 20 years would qualify for the transition payment. For funding 
reasons, the transition pay amount, a multiple of final annual basic pay, would be 
constant across all services for both enlisted and officers. Under Concept 1 and its lower 
second-career annuity, the DOD proposed a transition pay of 2.5 times the annual Hi-3 
basic pay, in essence two and a half years’ worth of basic pay. Concept 2, with its higher 
immediate annuity, contains a transition pay of 0.5 times the annual Hi-3 basic pay 
(DOD, 2014). 
d. Continuation Pay 
The DOD (2014) also recommended a mid-to-late career continuation pay, similar 
to career incentive bonuses currently employed. This component allows the DOD to 
target specific communities, specialties, or YOS cohorts that it designated for desired 
retention. Due to the varying nature of these needs, the proposal would allow the 
individual services to dictate the varying outlays required to meet force needs. Under 
Concept 1, the DOD suggested using a range of 0 to 2 months of basic pay for enlisted 
personnel and 5 to 8 months of basic pay for officers. Similarly, Concept 2 would use 0 
to 1 month of basic pay for enlisted personnel and 7 to 11 months of basic pay for 
officers. The DOD modeled the force-wide effect of these by assuming the enlisted pay 
would occur at 12 YOS for enlisted and 16 YOS for officers (DOD, 2014). Figure 1 
depicts the timeline for the annuities, transition payment, and continuation payment under 
Concept 1 as it compares to the current system. Table 5 lists the DOD assumptions used 
to evaluate the retirement concepts. 
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Figure 1.  Notional Timeline of Retired Pays, Concept 1 versus Current System 
(from Department of Defense, 2014, p. 12) 
 
Table 5.   DOD Assumptions Used for Evaluating Retirement 
Concepts (from Department of Defense, 2014, p. 17) 
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3. Assessment 
The DOD (2014) evaluated the two proposed concepts in terms of retention of the 
force structure, cost to the services and DOD, payments to the service member, and the 
effect on Treasury outlays. In doing so, the DOD completed analyses for each service, to 
include both officers and enlisted personnel. Reserve component assessments were also 
made but are not included in this thesis (DOD, 2014). 
The DOD (2014) modeling found that the two concepts would closely preserve 
the current force structure with regard to size and experience. The results showed some 
differences in estimated retention trends. Additionally, the cost estimates indicated that 
the military would save between $0.5 and $2.7 billion per year, depending on the specific 
parameters chosen for the analysis. These savings would occur once all members 
transitioned to the new system. Treasury outlays, however, would increase rapidly after 
implementation because of the immediate contributions to TSP. The total outlays decline 
once members falling under the previous plan age out of the system (DOD, 2014). 
The DOD (2014) model showed that the overall lifetime earnings for members 
would increase slightly with the new system. The model used a lifespan of 85 years, a 
five percent TSP account rate of return until age 65, and a four percent TSP rate of return 
after 65 (DOD, 2014). Table 6 compares an O-5 and E-7’s retirement compensation 
under Concept 1 to the compensation received under the current system. 
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Table 6.   Compensation under Concept 1 with 2.5% Multiplier 
(from Department of Defense, 2014, p. 29) 
C. CURRENT TRENDS IN PRIVATE SECTOR RETIREMENT 
COMPENSATION 
Private sector retirement plans continually evolve as employment categories shift 
and the supporting financial environment fluctuates (Costo, 2006). As such, the private 
sector contributes innovative ideas and new approaches to retirement reform and 
modernization. This section offers current trends and practices in private sector 
retirement compensation. While private sector employment differs from military service, 
private sector retirement ideas and concepts may be applied to the military retirement 
system, much like the inclusion of military members into the 401(k)-like Thrift Savings 
Plan. The research provided in this section comes primarily from human resource (HR) 
professional organizations, HR consultants, and government labor organizations. 
1. Background 
Over the last two decades, private sector retirement plans significantly shifted 
from defined benefit to defined contribution plans (Poterba, Venti, & Wise, 2007). Based 
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on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Costo, 2006), 32 percent of private industry 
workers participated in a defined contribution retirement plan from 1992 to 1993, 
compared to 35 percent participating in a defined benefit retirement plan. By 2005, that 
ratio shifted to 42 percent participation in a defined contribution plan compared to 21 
percent participation in a defined benefit plan (Costo, 2006). By 2013, the trend toward 
defined contribution participation continued with 42 percent of private industry workers 
participating in a defined contribution plan and only 16 percent participating in a defined 
benefit plan (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). Figure 2, based on Department of Labor 
Form 5500 filings, confirms this trend by depicting the total number of participants in 
defined contribution and defined benefit plans from 1975 to 2011 (Employee Benefits 
Security Administration, 2013). 
 
Figure 2.  Number of Participants in Pension Plans by Type of Plan, 1975–
2011 (numbers in millions) 
(from Employee Benefits Security Administration, 2013, p. 6) 
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Costo (2006) attributes this shift to two primary reasons: employment changes 
and defined benefit funding requirements. First, the labor force grew to include more 
service-oriented occupations while the typical defined benefit-offering industries 
remained steady or decreased. Additionally, union membership declined over the last 
decade, also contributing to the shift. Second, increasing liabilities attributed partly to 
changes in the discount rate applied to defined benefit funding caused unacceptably high 
contributions and unpredictable cash-flow requirements (Costo, 2006). 
2. Defined Benefit  
As Costo (2006) noted previously, the primary trend continues to be reductions in 
defined benefit plans offered by plan sponsors. Within the remaining defined benefit 
plans, however, plan sponsors continue to offer different types of defined benefits. The 
shift from traditional defined benefit plans to nontraditional defined benefit plans 
represents the most distinct observed trend (Costo, 2006). 
Traditional defined benefit plans calculate the retirement annuity based on a 
formula, similar to the military retirement system. The most common formula seen in the 
private sector uses an average of the final years’ earnings to calculate retirement benefits, 
much the same as the military system (Costo, 2006). 
Nontraditional plans offer different methods to calculate retirement benefits. 
Nontraditional plans are characterized as hybrid plans because they incorporate elements 
of defined contribution plans into a defined benefit plan (Costo, 2006). Similar to a 
defined contribution plan, these hybrid plans typically provide the notional value of a 
participant’s retirement account as a means of expressing its current value (Wiatrowski, 
2012). In 1980, virtually all defined benefit plans fell into the traditional category, but by 
2010, less than two-thirds of plans were considered traditional plans (Wiatrowski, 2012). 
Wiatrowski (2012) shows traditional defined benefit plans (“percent of terminal 
earnings,” “percent of career earnings,” and “dollar amount”) decline in favor of 
nontraditional plans (“cash balance”) in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3.  Percentage of Defined Benefit Pension Plan Participants, by Formula 
and Private Industry, for Selected Years During 1980–2010 
(from Wiatrowski, 2012, p. 13) 
a. Cash Balance Plan 
The most common hybrid defined benefit plan is the cash balance plan. A cash 
balance plan contains similarities to defined contribution plans in that employers make 
regular contributions to an account that accumulates value over time (Costo, 2006) and 
defines the benefit in terms of a stated account balance (Employee Benefits Security 
Administration, 2014). As a defined benefit plan, the plan sponsor still bears the 
responsibility for investing the plan assets (Rao, Higgins, & Taylor, 2002). The employer 
communicates the employee’s benefit as this account balance value, but no actual 
individual account exists because the funds are part of the larger combined pension trust 
(Johnson, Hatem & Scott, 2011; Wells Fargo, 2012). The Employee Benefits Security 
Administration (2014) describes these accounts “as ‘hypothetical accounts’ because they 




allocable to the account” (p. 1). Essentially, the employer contributes an amount on 
behalf of the employee to the pension trust and then gives the notional value of the 
accrued benefit to the employee.   
According to the Employee Benefits Security Administration (2014), employers 
credit a participant’s notional account each year with a pay credit equal to a percentage of 
annual compensation and an interest credit based on an index such as the 30-year 
Treasury bill rate. The plan guarantees the value of these credits regardless of fluctuations 
in the value of the plan’s investments. As such, the employer bears the investment risk 
(Employee Benefits Security Administration, 2014). 
For employers, cash balance plans can be beneficial because employers can keep 
any excess returns generated by the pension fund assets (Rao et al., 2002). In a thriving 
market, this can be a very appealing feature. The employer, however, faces higher costs 
in down markets to cover liabilities from asset losses (Rao et al., 2002). 
Upon vesting in the plan, the employee receives the account balance at retirement 
or employment termination. The departing employee can annuitize the account value for 
retirement or roll the lump sum value of the account into an individual retirement account 
(IRA) or another employer’s plan (if it accepts rollovers) (Employee Benefits Security 
Administration, 2014). 
Changing from a traditional defined benefit plan to a cash balance plan creates 
advantages and disadvantages for the separate stakeholders: employees and employers. 
Wells Fargo (2012) offers a summary of these advantages and disadvantages in Table 7. 
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Table 7.   Advantages and Disadvantages for Employers and 
Employees in Private Sector Cash Balance Defined Benefit Plans 
(after Wells Fargo, 2012) 
Another employee disadvantage associated with cash balance plans is that the 
guaranteed rate of return is generally less than stock market returns (Rao et al., 2002). 
According to Kravitz, Inc. (2013), a retirement plan administrator, the interest credit 
rating most commonly used for cash balance plans is the 30-year Treasury bond, 
averaging about four to five percent over the past decade. The Internal Revenue Service, 
however, published new regulations in 2010 allowing the use of the actual rate of return 
of the assets or fixed rates up to five percent (Kravitz, 2013). 
Wells Fargo (2012) describes cash balance plans as being better for companies 
that retain a young and mobile workforce. The cash balance plan provides significant 
benefits for younger employees and consequently helps to attract this type of employee. 
A traditional defined benefit plan tends to favor the older employee who has attained a 
higher salary and accrued many more years of service (Wells Fargo, 2012). Appendix A 
contains a detailed comparison of traditional, cash balance, and defined contribution 
plans. 
Advantages to Employee Disadvantages to Employee Advantages to Employer Disadvantages to Employer
Accounts earn guaranteed interest rate
Reflects average salary over full 
career, rather than final 
compensation
Increase employee understanding and 
appreciation of retirement benefits
Provide larger benefits for short-
service and young employees
Benefits funded without regard to 
profits
Participant shoulders future risk 
after receiving lump sum
Simplifies communication to employees
Complexity of converting to this plan, 
especially the education and 
communication process, often 
underestimated
Benefits are portable – benefits can be 
rolled over to new retirement account
Simplifies retirement plan design, making 
benefits easier and simpler to calculate
Will create some “winners” and 
“losers” in ultimate benefits for 
participants when switching from a 
traditional plan
Lump sum or annuity options available
Recognizes changing workforce 
demographics and career patterns
Lump sum payment moves future risk 
to employee and may not provide 
enough to maintain employee’s 
retirement standard of living
Benefits guaranteed by Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation
Consolidates benefit programs and 
merges them into a unified plan following 
merger or acquisition
Administration more involved than 
traditional DB plans because of 
tracking requirement for employee 
work history
Makes costs under the DB plan more 
predictable and easier to control
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Cost reduction provides another key motive for private industry companies to 
switch from a traditional plan to a cash balance plan. The design of a cash balance plan 
offers more manageable and less volatile costs over time (Wells Fargo, 2012). 
Additionally, cash balance plans are simpler, and consequently less expensive, to 
administer than traditional defined benefit plans (Johnston et al., 2011). 
3. Defined Contribution 
Costo (2006) explained the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution 
plans in the private industry over the last two decades. This section describes the current 
defined contribution compensation trends observed within the private sector in 2012 and 
2013. The research describes trends in categories appropriate for this thesis. While 
important to private sector plan management, aspects such as plan expense and fee 
disclosures are not reported because they are beyond the scope of this thesis. The 
information and trends presented are based on published survey data from the Plan 
Sponsor Council of America, HR consultant Aon Hewitt, HR consultant WorldatWork, 
the American Benefits Institute, Fidelity Investments, and State Street Global Advisors.    
a. Enrollment and Participation 
In its 56
th
 Annual Survey of Profit Sharing and 401(k) Plans, the Plan Sponsor 
Council of America (PSCA) (2013) found that 87.6 percent of employees maintain a 
defined contribution account balance and an average of 80.7 percent of employees made 
contributions to their plans in 2012. WorldatWork and the American Benefits Institute 
(2013) data support this figure. Their report states that 57 percent of respondents had 
employee participation rates above 80 percent.   
The literature shows an increasing trend for auto-enrollment into the company’s 
retirement plan. Auto-enrollment, as opposed to voluntary enrollment, achieves a much 
higher participation rate. State Street Global Advisors (2013) found that 57 percent of 
plans use auto-enrollment, equating to a 16 percent increase from 2010. Companies using 
auto-enrollment have an average participation rate of 82 percent, compared to 57 percent 
for those with voluntary enrollment (State Street Global Advisors, 2013). Fidelity 
Investments (2014) conducted a survey that showed a 17 percent increase in auto-
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enrollment usage from 2009. This increase positively affected plan participation rates; 
with auto-enrollment, 84 percent of employees participated in the company’s retirement 
plan compared to 53 percent participation without auto-enrollment (Fidelity Investments, 
2014). 
b. Vesting 
The PSCA (2013) found that immediate full vesting in the retirement plan is the 
most common vesting schedule found in the private sector. The survey data showed that 
46.4 percent of retirement plans with over 5,000 participants offer immediate full vesting. 
The next two most-occurring vesting schedules for plans with over 5,000 participants 
were 5-year graduated vesting and 3-year cliff vesting, representing 18.1 percent and 16.7 
percent of plans, respectively (Plan Sponsor Council of America, 2013).   
c. Matching Contributions 
The two most common company matching formulas use 50 percent of employee 
deferrals up to six percent and 100 percent of employee deferrals up to six percent, 
respectively. The current observed trend shows companies shifting from using the 50 
percent formula to using the 100 percent formula. For 2008, 50.0 percent of companies 
matched 50 percent of deferrals and only 25.6 percent of companies matched 100 percent 
(Plan Sponsor Council of America, 2009). By 2012, the PSCA (2013) results show a 
decrease to 40.0 percent of companies matching 50 percent of deferrals and an increase to 
38.1 percent of companies matching 100 percent of deferrals. The maximum limits vary 
slightly, but the most observed limit is matching up to six percent of total salary. Table 8 
summarizes the PSCA data for the most common formulas used to calculate employer 
matching contributions. State Street Global Advisors (2013) also found that the most 
common matching contribution formula was 50 percent up to the first six percent of pay, 
but in 2013, Aon Hewitt (2013a) found that a formula of 100 percent up to six percent of 
pay eclipsed the 50 percent up to six percent formula for the first time in 20 years. While 
the data vary, the trend shows plan sponsors moving toward a matching contribution of 
100 percent of pay.  
 41 
 
Table 8.   Selected PSCA Data for Most Common Company 
Matching Formulas (after Plan Sponsor Council of America, 2009; Plan 
Sponsor Council of America, 2013) 
d. Roth Availability 
Plan sponsors continue to add Roth 401(k) options to their plans. According to the 
PSCA (2013), 53.8 percent of plans contained Roth 401(k) options in 2012. This shows 
an increase from 36.7 percent in 2008 (Plan Sponsor Council of America, 2013). Aon 
Hewitt (2013a) observed this same trend and attributed the increase to employers 
recognizing that employees fall into different tax situations. Fidelity Investments (2013) 
found that the highest percentage of Roth participation came from younger employees in 
the Millennial generation. 
e. Target-Date Funds 
Target-date fund usage in 401(k) plans continues to grow. Target-date funds, also 
referred to as lifecycle or age-based funds, simplify long-term investment by 
automatically shifting assets from riskier equities to more conservative ones as the fund 
approaches its “target-date” (Schwartz, 2010). In 2012, 64.5 percent of plans offered 
target-date funds, while only 33.4 percent of plans offered them in 2006 (Plan Sponsor 
Council of America, 2009; Plan Sponsor Council of America, 2013). WorldatWork and 
the American Benefits Institute (2013) found that target-date funds were the most 
common investment choice for employees, with 68 percent contributing to them. Fidelity 
Investments (2013) termed this trend as “the growing prevalence of ‘do it for me’ 401(k) 
options” (p. 3). 
2008 2012
Total 50% match (all plans) 50.0% 40.0%
Plans up to 6% of pay 29.0% 26.3%
Total 100% match (all plans) 25.6% 38.1%
Plans up to 4% of pay 5.2% 10.9%
Plans up to 5% of pay 3.7% 9.7%
Plans up to 6% of pay 7.0% 9.7%
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Interestingly, VanDerhei, Holden, Alonso, and Bass (2013) noted that younger 
employees allocated a much higher percentage of assets in target-date funds than older 
employees. They found that employees aged 20 to 29 allocated 34.2 percent of their 
assets in target-date funds. Employees aged 40 to 49 only allocated 15.7 percent 
(VanDerhei et al., 2013). Schwartz (2010) partly attributes target-date funds’ increasing 
popularity to the Pension Protection Act of 2006 allowing them to be used as a default for 
auto-enrollment plans.    
4. Financial Well-Being 
The recent financial crisis caused a number of employees to struggle with 
personal financial issues. These personal issues created some unwillingness and inability 
to participate in and contribute to an employer’s retirement plan (WorldatWork & 
American Benefits Institute, 2013). Fidelity Investments (2014) noted that 77 percent of 
their survey respondents did not have “the time or investment knowledge to be confident 
in their investment decisions” (p. 3). State Street Global Advisors (2013) succinctly 
described this as “participants are hungry for help” (p. 10). Consequently, Aon Hewitt 
(2013b) found that “plan sponsors are embracing a more holistic perspective on their 
retirement programs by focusing on financial wellness and measuring projected 
retirement income adequacy” (p. 4).  
State Street Global Advisors’ (2013) data supports the need for financial 
education. They found that nine percent of participants considered themselves “extremely 
knowledgeable” and slightly more than a third of respondents described themselves as 
“fairly knowledgeable.” Even with this lack of financial knowledge, 36 percent of their 
respondents stated that they make their own financial decisions (State Street Global 
Advisors, 2013).  
Plan sponsors continue to focus on their employees’ overall financial well-being 
and are now offering many resources to assist them (Aon Hewitt, 2014). Aon Hewitt 
(2014) noted that over three-quarters of their respondents indicated that they were either 
“very likely” or “somewhat likely” to prioritize employees’ financial wellness in 2014. 
Aon Hewitt’s (2014) survey of 400 plan sponsors (representing 10 million participants) 
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found four channels through which employers were expanding their focus on financial 
well-being. Specifically, these include: 
 Offering and promoting services to help employees manage their day-to-
day finances 
 Providing online modeling tools and mobile applications 
 Reviewing and reducing investment fees 
 Facilitating access to professionals (Aon Hewitt, 2014, p. 3–4) 
With the decrease in defined benefit pension plans and their resulting contribution 
to retirement income, employers are shifting their guidance from emphasizing the size of 
contributions to their retirement plan to taking more paternalistic approaches like 
“outcome-based” retirement plans (Fidelity Investments, 2014). The companies have 
indicated they intend to educate and advise their workforce on the best implementation of 
their retirement plan and its potential retirement income (Fidelity Investments, 2014). 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Military retirement system reform and modernization began in 1948 with the 
Hook Commission. More than 65 years and numerous reform commissions later, no 
meaningful and lasting reforms have been adopted. The current DOD proposal attempts 
to provide a complete military retirement system modernization by reducing the total 
amount of the lifetime annuity and replacing it with cash payments and a defined 
contribution component. Private sector employers continue to shift from defined benefit 
plans to defined contribution plans. Current private sector trends indicate that employers, 
most of whom offer defined contribution plans, are concerned with the retirement 
outcomes of their employees, many of whom do not possess significant financial 
knowledge. Private sector companies that still offer a defined benefit plan show a trend of 
switching from traditional defined benefit plans to cash balance plans. Cash balance 
defined benefit plans offer a hybrid approach that incorporates defined contribution-like 
aspects, but with a guaranteed outcome, thus providing a more paternalistic alternative 
than cash payments and contributions to a defined contribution plan. 
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IV. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE 
This chapter details an alternative reform for the military retirement system and 
explains the reasons that make this alternative a viable system. The chapter then describes 
the methodology used to compare the proposed alternative to both the current system and 
the Department of Defense (DOD) proposal described in the previous chapter. It 
describes the calculations performed to create the retired members’ annual cash flows 
under each system. These cash flows then provide the basis for present value (PV) 
calculations used to compare the three systems. From this point, the retirement system 
proposed in this thesis is referred to as “the alternative system.” 
A. ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM 
The alternative system is a hybrid system because it contains two separate defined 
benefit retirement vehicles: a cash balance component and an old age annuity beginning 
at age 62. The cash balance component was based on research discussed in Chapter III. 
The DOD proposal described in Chapter III demonstrated the DOD’s willingness to 
provide contributions and bonuses to modernize the military retirement system.  As such, 
these aspects were included into the alternative system’s cash balance component. 
Additionally, the DOD proposal retained an old age annuity similar to the current system. 
The alternative system leveraged this old age annuity component to maintain some 
similarity to the current system and to provide a steady retirement income when a retiree 
exits the labor force.  
The alternative system’s design provides the service member with an option that 
provides an annual income similar to the current system for members serving at least 20 
years. Consequently, the member would retain the same, if not greater, benefit than the 
current system. The alternative system’s architecture offers a portable benefit to vested 
members not serving the full 20 years, and allows the member to move that benefit to 
another retirement plan or individual retirement account (IRA) upon leaving military 
service. The alternative system creates a force management tool by providing large bonus 
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contributions periodically throughout a member’s career, and it reduces cost by moving 
large deferred compensation outlays earlier in a member’s career. 
Service members vest in the cash balance component at 6 years and one day of 
service , similar to the DOD proposal described in Chapter III, and then vest in the old 
age annuity after reaching 20 years of service (YOS). Thus, the alternative system 
provides a retirement benefit to members serving at least six years but not the full 20 
years. This alternative system is designed to provide higher contributions into a 
retirement trust early in a member’s career so that those contributions can begin accruing 
interest and grow in value. To offset these higher initial contributions’ cost, the 
alternative system eliminates the second career annuity, defined as the annuity from 
military retirement until age 62. Upon retiring after 20 YOS, however, service members 
may elect to annuitize the cash balance value until age 62 or elect to roll the lump sum 
value into another retirement plan of their choice. At age 62, the member receives the 




Figure 4.  Graphical Depiction of Proposed Alternative Retirement System 
Ultimately, the plan design allows for the cash balance annuity option to provide 
similar annual payments during the second career period to those of the current system. 
Thus, the service member receives a lifetime benefit similar to the current system. The 
following sections describe the alternative system’s components.   
1. Cash Balance Component 
The cash balance component provides a guaranteed benefit level. This guaranteed 
benefit is accomplished by making an annual contribution to a retirement pension-like 
trust fund on the member’s behalf and assuring that accumulated value upon leaving 
military service. Additionally, the trust fund guarantees a rate of return based on the 
accumulated value of the notional account and a specific interest rate. While the member 
does not have an actual individual account, the member is guaranteed the accumulated 
value that is paid out of the trust. From this point, the annual contribution is referred to as 
the “pay credit” and the interest payment is referred to as the “interest credit.”   
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a. Pay Credit and Bonuses 
The pay credits begin when a member enters into military service. Each year, the 
government will contribute 15 percent of a member’s annual basic pay to the retirement 
trust based on the member’s annual basic pay. This pay credit percentage allows 
significant growth and recognizes the difficult characteristics associated with military 
service, such as combat, hazardous duties, family separation, and a spouse’s hindered 
career. The pay credits at the beginning of a member’s career will be much less than the 
pay credits when the member nears retirement, much like a defined contribution system. 
The pay credits will end after a member reaches 20 YOS, regardless of the member 
continuing service or retiring. In keeping with the retention goals of the DOD proposal 
discussed in the previous chapter (DOD, 2014), the member vests in these contributions 
upon completing six years and one day of service. 
To further incentivize retention and reward continued service, large individual 
bonus contributions will be made at the 6, 10, and 15 YOS points in a member’s career. 
These bonuses will be referred to as “longevity bonuses.” The longevity bonuses will be 
tied to a specific number of months of the member’s current basic pay and progressively 
get larger as the member continues serving. Thus, these bonuses will be protected from 
inflation, assuming Congress annually adjusts military basic pay for inflation. These large 
contributions provide the additional principal required to grow the cash balance account 
to a value that can support a second career annuity similar to the current Hi-3 system. 
While beyond the scope of this thesis, the government could require an additional 
term of obligated service, such as two or three years, for accepting these bonuses to 
prevent a member exiting military service immediately after receiving a bonus payment. 
If this policy was implemented, the member would only be two to three years away from 
the next large bonus after completing the previous obligation. Table 9 shows the 
longevity bonus payment schedule and values. 
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Table 9.   Alternative System’s Longevity Bonus Payments 
In keeping with a cash balance plan design, each pay credit and bonus will be 
placed into a retirement pension-like trust fund that is managed by professional 
retirement plan managers. Thus, knowledgeable financial managers will control the trust 
fund’s investments to achieve the desired return on its investments.  
The retirement trust fund will be subject to stock and bond market volatility. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, private sector cash balance plans can record their 
funds’ excess returns as profit for the plan sponsors. During times when the pension trust 
returns a higher rate than required, the excess can be retained within the fund to help 
cover future potential liabilities. During down stock and bond markets, the government, 
via the trust fund, will hold the risk to provide the members’ guaranteed account value, 
but be able to partially offset these liabilities by the previous years’ excess returns.   
b. Interest Credit 
The government designates a guaranteed annual rate of return on the member’s 
accumulated account value and credits that return to the account. At the end of the year, 
an interest credit equal to the cash balance account value multiplied by the specified 
interest credit rate will be added to the total account value. Thus, the total accumulated 
value at the beginning of the following year will be equal to the accumulated value at the 
start of the previous year plus the annual pay credit and any bonus (if in year 6, 10, or 15) 
plus the interest credit given to the cash balance account. To mitigate the potential future 
liability associated with stock and bond market volatility, the designated interest credit 
rate will be tied to a conservative rate such as the 30-year Treasury yield. Additionally, 
members continuing service beyond 20 years will continue to receive an annual interest 
Bonus Payment 
Schedule (YOS)
Value                      





credit as their account value continues to appreciate, even though the pay credits stopped 
at 20 YOS. Table 10 summarizes the architecture of the cash balance component. 
 
Table 10.   Summary of Cash Balance Component for the Alternative 
Plan 
c. Cash Balance Options 
Upon full retirement (20 YOS), the member has the choice to either annuitize the 
value of the cash balance account or roll the lump sum value into another retirement plan. 
The annuity length is from the time a member leaves the service until age 62. The 
government contributions (pay credits and bonuses) and interest credits are designed to 
provide an annuitized retirement income similar to the current system. This option is 
beneficial to retiring members desiring an immediate retirement income similar to the 
current system. 
Alternately, the retiring service member can take the lump sum value and invest it 
in a future employer’s retirement plan or an IRA. This option allows a retiree who does 
not desire an immediate retirement income to let the lump sum value continue to grow 
until the retiree fully exits the labor force. For simplicity, it is assumed in this thesis that 
the member exits the labor force at age 62. After exiting the labor force, the retiree can 
Notes
Vests 6 years and 1 day
Pay Credit 15% of Annual Basic Pay
Begins at military entry; Ends 
at 20 YOS
Bonuses 6, 10, and 15 YOS
Specific number of months 
basic pay
Interest Credit Tied to Interest Credit Rate
Typically 30-year Treasury 
yield; Members over 20 
YOS still credited annually
Accumulated Value
Previous Account Value + 




then begin withdrawals from this rollover retirement account. Vested members serving 
less than 20 YOS fall under this rollover option.  
2. Old Age Annuity 
The old age annuity begins at age 62 and continues for the life of the retiree. A 
service member vests in this component after 20 YOS. The annuity benefit uses the same 
Hi-3 base and 2.5 percent multiplier as the current system to calculate the annuity 
payments. Thus, a member serving greater than 20 years still receives a larger benefit in 
this stage of retirement than a member serving 20 years. This component provides a 
steady retirement income after the retiree exits the labor force and can use the established 
Military Retirement Fund to provide the required payments.  
3. Advantages 
The alternative system offers a conservative approach to military retirement 
modernization that contains advantages over the other two systems. The alternative 
system is designed to reduce the overall system cost, but provide a similar, consistent 
benefit to the retiree. During retirement, the retiree should see a similar, if not better, 
annual income with the alternative system. 
The large longevity bonuses are intended to incentivize and reward continued 
service and provide a force management tool. Contributing the bonuses to a cash balance 
plan removes the member’s ability to use the money for non-retirement expenditures such 
as buying a new car while still serving. The bonuses can then grow in a managed account 
and be used in retirement as they were intended. Investing the bonus for the member 
instead of paying the bonus in cash provides a conservative approach to compensation. 
The cash balance trust provides a managed account that guarantees growth. The 
managed account gives an investment vehicle that accounts for a member’s potential 
deficiency in financial and investment knowledge. From the member’s perspective, this 
removes most of the risk associated with a defined contribution account. The member 
will have a guaranteed value for retirement income. The retirement trust also offers a 
paternalistic approach by managing the account on behalf of the member. 
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The cash balance account offers a portable benefit similar to retirement plans 
found in the private sector. After vesting, the member can transition the account balance 
to another retirement plan upon leaving the military. The cash balance account also gives 
a member retiring at 20 YOS a choice of how to claim the benefit: annuitize or continue 
investing to let the balance grow.  
The 15 percent contribution rate is greater than twice the average private sector 
defined contribution discussed in Chapter III. This large compensation could serve as a 
recruitment and retention tool for force managers. 
4. Disadvantages 
The alternative system does contain disadvantages for the government and 
individual member when compared to the DOD proposal described in the previous 
chapter. First, the alternative system places the risk on the government, via the cash 
balance retirement trust, to achieve the four percent returns required to pay the four 
percent interest credit. This risk may be mitigated by reinvesting returns from “up” years 
to cover liabilities from “down” years. 
Second, the cash balance plan removes some choice from the member when 
compared to the DOD proposal. The managed account does not allow the member to 
determine how the cash balance account is invested. The tradeoff occurs, however, 
because the cash balance account value is guaranteed instead of being susceptible to 
fluctuations in the stock and bond markets.  
Lastly, contributing the longevity bonuses to the cash balance account defers that 
compensation until a later date. This deferral does not satisfy a member’s desire for 
current compensation. Members, however, can view their notional account values and see 
a large increase in them. This provides some recognition of current compensation. As 




The alternative system was compared to the current military retirement system 
and the DOD proposal described in Chapter III. From this point, the DOD proposal is 
referred to as the “DOD system.” To achieve comparability, the annual cash flows for 
each system were calculated and then discounted to show the present value (PV) of each 
system at retirement. The calculated PV shows a single value that represents the present 
value sum of different cash flows, and is calculated using the Discounted Cash Flow 
(DCF) equation (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2011). The calculations were conducted from 
the viewpoint of maintaining a similar retirement income for the retiree; thus, the highest 
PV gives the best option for the retiree. Additionally, the alternative system’s cost 
savings compared to the current system were estimated. 
1. Assumptions 
The officer and enlisted basic pay tables for 2012 through 2014 provided the basis 
for all calculations. To simplify the calculations, inflation was not included as a variable. 
It was assumed that basic pay will be increased to match inflation. As such, the 
calculations do not provide absolute estimates, but do offer a relative system comparison 
using the same inputs. The following sections explain the calculations performed. 
The DOD system’s published self-assessment based its calculations on two career 
paths: an O-5 serving 20 years and an E-7 serving 20 years (DOD, 2014). The same two 
career paths were used to provide a comparable benefit estimation for each system. 
Accordingly, it was assumed in this thesis that the O-5 entered service at age 23 and 
retired at age 43, and the E-7 entered service at age 20 and retired at age 40. These two 
careers require second career annuities for 19 and 22 years, respectively. Consequently, 
the respective annuities require larger cash balance account values to provide a similar 
benefit to the current system during the second career retirement phase.  In order to 
provide a sensitivity analysis, the benefits for an O-6 serving 30 years and an E-9 serving 
30 years were calculated. 
Additionally, the DOD system contained a continuation bonus that amounted to a 
cash payment at a specified YOS milestone. The DOD self-assessment did not include 
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this bonus in its calculations because of the varying nature of the payments (DOD, 2014). 
Consequently, this continuation bonus was not included in the DOD system model. 
2. Contribution Calculations 
The alternative and DOD systems both contain contributions that gradually 
increase in value as service members progress through their careers. To determine these 
contributions’ annual value, a standard promotion schedule based on YOS for both 
officers and enlisted personnel was used, regardless of officer promotion board results, 
enlisted advancement exam results, or branch of service. The model assumes that all 
service members promote to the next pay grade after achieving the appropriate time in the 
previous rank. The promotion schedule stops at 30 YOS. To simplify calculations, 
officers with previous enlisted service and warrant officers were excluded, as were 
general officers. Tables 11 and 12 depict the model’s promotion schedule for officers and 
enlisted personnel. 
 
Table 11.   Officer Promotion Schedule (after Powers, 2012b) 
Pay Grade
Time in Grade 
(years)










Table 12.   Enlisted Personnel Promotion Schedule (after Powers, 
2012a) 
To calculate a member’s annual pay, the model assumed the corresponding rank 
for each cumulative year in service found in Tables 10 and 11. For example, an enlisted 
member at 8 YOS was assumed to be at the E-5 pay grade. For years that were split 
between pay grades, the annual pay was calculated by using half a year’s pay in the lower 
rank and half a year’s pay at the higher rank, providing an average for the year. 
Subsequently, the model created a notional annual pay scale for a member based on 2014 
basic pay rates and these promotion schedules 
The thesis incorporated the calculated notional pay scale and both systems’ 
contribution rates to determine the annual contributions for the respective systems. For 
example, if the notional annual basic pay was $50,000 for the service member, the 
alternative system made a $7,500 contribution based on the 15 percent contribution rate. 
Similarly, the DOD system used a five percent rate to give a $2,500 contribution, 
beginning after two YOS (DOD, 2014).  
A growth rate was applied to both systems’ accumulated contribution values. For 
the alternative system, the interest credit was calculated by adding four percent of the 
previous year’s account value to the accumulated contribution value. For example, a 
previous year’s $10,000 accumulated account value earned a $400 interest credit to give a 
total cash balance account value of $10,400 in the current year. A similar calculation was 
made for the DOD system using a five percent annual growth rate for the Thrift Savings 
Pay Grade
Time in Grade 
(years)












Plan (TSP) (DOD, 2014). The total accumulated value for each contribution account 
provided the present value at retirement for the respective systems’ cash balance and TSP 
accounts.  
3. Discount Rate 
The discount rate adjusts future cash flows into present value terms. It accounts 
for the time value of money, which can be described as $100 today is worth more than 
$100 next year (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2011). The DOD Office of the Actuary used a 
5.75 percent discount rate to calculate the value of the fiscal year 2011 military 
retirement system, but annotated that a 5.5 percent discount rate would be used in the 
next valuation of the retirement system (DOD Office of the Actuary, 2013). Thus, a 5.5 
percent discount rate was used as the basis for the present value calculations in this thesis. 
Additionally, Warner and Pleeter’s (2001) study of the military downsizing in the 1990s 
showed that military members may have personal discount rates up to 18 percent. Thus, 
18 percent was used as the upper bound for a sensitivity analysis of the discount rate’s 
effect on present value. 
4. Present and Future Value Calculations 
All three systems required present value, future value, or a combination of both 
calculations. To calculate the PV of the current retirement benefit and the old age 
annuities of the alternative and DOD systems, the monthly payout, based on the Hi-3 
system with a 2.5 percent multiplier, was multiplied by 12 to give the annual annuity 
benefit. This value was used as the annual cash flow for the annuity. The following 












                                                                                              (1) 
Where C is the annuity cash payment, d is the discount rate, and t is the number of 
periods in the annuity (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2011). Equation 1 provided the full PV 
at retirement age for a service member using the current system; it also gave the second 
career annuity’s PV (at retirement age) used in the DOD system.   
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For the alternative and DOD old age annuities, the PV calculated from equation 1 
was further discounted from the age at which the old annuity began to the military 
retirement age. The following equation was used to discount the annuity PV at old age to 









                                                                                                                   (2) 
Where FVAnnuity equals PV of the old age annuity at the old age start, d is the discount 
rate, and t is the number of years between military retirement and the old age annuity 
beginning (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2011). The calculated PV of the old age annuity 
from Equation 1 was used as the FVAnnuity variable in Equation 2. 
The DOD system’s TSP account value was modeled to grow at a five percent 
interest rate from military retirement until old age (65). Equation 2 was algebraically 
rearranged to give the calculated future value using the following equation: 
(1 )tTSP TSPFV PV g                                                                                                          (3) 
Where PVTSP equals the value of the TSP account at military retirement, g is the growth 
rate, and t is the number of years from military retirement to age 65. 
Finally, the cash balance lump sum value (alternative system), transition payment 
(DOD system) and TSP account (DOD system) were converted into annuity cash flows 
for defined lengths. Algebraically rearranging Equation 1 gave the formula for 














                                                                                                              (4) 
Where B is the principal value of the cash balance account, transition payment, or TSP 
account; r is the interest rate; and t is the annuity length in years. The cash balance 
account and transition payment were annuitized from military retirement age to the old 
age annuity beginning. The TSP account was annuitized from the DOD old age annuity 
start (age 65) until age 85 to maintain comparability to the DOD self-assessment 
described in Chapter III. Combining these annuity values with the annuities based on Hi-
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3 gave the annual cash flows generated by each system. Table 13 summarizes the 
components and timelines used to calculate the annual individual cash flows. 
 
Table 13.    Summary of Individual Cash Flow Components 
Generated by Each System. 
5. Cost Calculation 
The current and alternative systems’ costs were approximated to provide another 
comparison method. The DOD system’s cost was not calculated due to a lack of data 
regarding the second career annuity and actual Hi-3 values for service members in this 
period. As such, the DOD system’s second career annuity could not be precisely 
estimated, and the DOD system’s cost was excluded from this analysis. 
The annual outlay for non-disability retirement benefits was calculated for the 
second career portion of the current system. The DOD Office of the Actuary’s (2013) 
Valuation of the Military Retirement System—September 30, 2011 provided the average 
outlays for fiscal year 2011 within the relevant range for the alternative system’s second 
career. The officer outlays for members between ages 43 and 62 and enlisted personnel 
outlays between ages 40 and 62 were used to approximate the current cost of the second 
career portion of the current system. The combined officer and enlisted total outlay 
offered a basis from which to compare the alternative system to the current system. 
Model Cash Flow Component
Value Used in 
Calculation
Age Length (t )
† Interest Rate 
(r )
Current System Hi-3 2.5%*Hi-3*YOS Retirement–85 NA
Cash Balance Annuity
††  Cash Balance Lump Sum Retirement–62 4.0%
Old Age Annuity 2.5%*Hi-3*YOS 62–85 NA
Transition Payment Annuity




2.5%*Hi-3*YOS          
(capped at 25%)
Retirement–65 NA
TSP Account Annuity TSP Lump Sum
††† 65–85 4%
Old Age Annuity 2.5%*Hi-3*YOS 65–85 NA
DOD System
Alternative System
†Officer military retirement age is 43, enlisted personnel retirement age is 40.
††Member also has option to roll lump sum into another retirement plan.
†††Assumed 5% growth from retirement until age 65.
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The 2014 basic pay scale, 2011 force manning numbers, and previously described 
average career promotion schedules were used to calculate the estimated outlays 
attributed to the alternative system’s pay credit and longevity bonus portions of the 
respective systems. The DOD Office of the Actuary’s (2013) Valuation of the Military 
Retirement System—September 30, 2011 provided the 2011 force manning numbers for 
officers and enlisted personnel at each YOS.  
The alternative system’s cost estimate did not include the interest credit payments. 
It was assumed that the return on the trust would provide the four percent interest credit 
and was not included in the cost estimation. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter explained the alternative military retirement system proposed in this 
thesis and described the calculations performed to compare it to the current retirement 
system and one proposed by the DOD. The alternative system provides deferred 
compensation payments early in a member’s career and allows the payments to grow in a 
retirement trust prior to the member receiving them. The alternative system also offers an 
earlier vesting time that gives a service member who does not serve the full 20 YOS a 
portable benefit that can be moved into another retirement account. 
This chapter explained the methodology used to model the annual retirement cash 
payments for each system. The PV and annuity calculations provided individual 
payments during corresponding periods of a retiree’s lifetime. These individual payments 
were summed to show the combined annual retirement income. Additionally, the method 
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V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains the results from calculations performed to compare the three 
systems. The chapter presents the three systems’ annual payments made to the individual 
as well as the cumulative lifetime payments. From those payments, the systems’ present 
values (PV) are then compared using the 5.5 percent discount rate determined in the 
previous chapter. To further compare PVs, the chapter also includes each system’s 
present values at every year of service (YOS) during a 20-year career, for both officers 
and enlisted personnel. 
The chapter includes sensitivity analyses and a cost comparison to the current 
system. The first sensitivity analysis shows the discount rate’s effect on PV and the 
corresponding indifference points between the alternative system and the other systems. 
The second sensitivity analysis shows the alternative system’s annual retirement 
payments for members serving 30 years. This shows that a member receives an increased 
retirement benefit for longer service using the alternative system. 
The chapter concludes with the estimated cost comparison between the alternative 
system and the current system. This shows that the alternative system can reduce the 
military retirement system’s cost while still providing a benefit similar to the current 
system. 
B.  CASH FLOW RESULTS 
1. Current System 
The basic pay tables from 2012, 2013, and 2014 were used to calculate the highest 
three years’ average basic pay (Hi-3) for an E-7 and an O-5 retiring at 20 YOS. Those 
values were multiplied by the 2.5 percent multiplier and 20 YOS to give the annual 
retirement income for those service members. Table 14 shows the current system’s 
retirement benefits for an E-7 and O-5 retiring after 20 YOS. 
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Table 14.   Annual Retirement Payment for an E-7 and an O-5 Retiring 
in 2014 after 20 YOS 
2. Alternative System 
The alternative system contained two sources of cash flows: the cash balance plan 
and the Hi-3 old age annuity. The model first calculated the annual cash balance 
component’s pay credits, interest credits, and longevity bonuses allocated to the service 
member throughout a 20-year career. The model showed that an officer would 
accumulate a cash balance account value of $734,774 and an enlisted member would 
achieve a value of $382,896. Figure 5 shows the alternative model’s cash balance value 
for both an officer and enlisted member at each YOS.   
 
Figure 5.  Growth of Cash Balance Account Value at Each YOS 
In Figure 5, the slopes of the lines gradually increase as the member promotes 
into higher pay grades and consequently receives larger pay credit amounts. The 
Pay Grade





longevity bonuses account for the distinct increases at years 6, 10, and 15. Tables 15 and 
16 show the values for an officer’s account and an enlisted member’s account. 
 
Table 15.   Annual Contributions to an Officer’s Cash Balance 
Account 
As shown in Table 15, the longevity bonuses provide the highest cumulative 
contributions to the cash balance account. This provides an incentive for members to 
accept these bonuses and remain in active service. For example, officers leaving after 8 
YOS will receive their vested account value of $84,099. If those same officers were to 
serve an additional four years and leave after 12 YOS, however, they would receive 









1 5,229$        209$                    -$           5,439$                
2 5,627$        218$                    -$           11,283$              
3 6,862$        451$                    -$           18,596$              
4 7,903$        744$                    -$           27,243$              
5 8,531$        1,090$                 -$           36,864$              
6 9,748$        1,475$                 10,831$      58,917$              
7 9,748$        2,357$                 -$           71,021$              
8 10,237$      2,841$                 -$           84,099$              
9 10,237$      3,364$                 -$           97,699$              
10 10,553$      3,908$                 118,676$    230,836$            
11 11,868$      9,233$                 -$           251,937$            
12 12,458$      10,077$               -$           274,473$            
13 12,458$      10,979$               -$           297,910$            
14 12,869$      11,916$               -$           322,696$            
15 12,869$      12,908$               191,376$    539,849$            
16 13,120$      21,594$               -$           574,562$            
17 14,353$      22,982$               -$           611,898$            
18 14,759$      24,476$               -$           651,133$            
19 14,759$      26,045$               -$           691,937$            
20 15,160$      27,677$               -$           734,774$            
Total 219,347$    194,545$             320,882$    734,774$            
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officer would receive a competitive benefit compared to the private sector’s standard 
matching, up to six percent. 
 
Table 16.   Annual Contributions to an Enlisted Member’s Cash 
Balance Account 
Table 15 shows that enlisted members will also receive a notable retirement 
benefit from the cash balance component. Similar to officers, enlisted members staying 
on active duty until 12 YOS will receive a 223-percent larger benefit than if they left 
military service after 8 YOS. After vesting, an enlisted member departing active duty 
service will receive a benefit larger than one received from a private sector employer 
matching six percent of similar compensation. 
YOS
 Annual Pay 
Credit 





1 2,924$        117$                    -$           3,041$                
2 3,170$        122$                    -$           6,332$                
3 3,619$        253$                    -$           10,204$              
4 3,988$        408$                    -$           14,601$              
5 4,190$        584$                    -$           19,375$              
6 4,922$        775$                    5,469$        30,541$              
7 4,922$        1,222$                 -$           36,685$              
8 5,260$        1,467$                 -$           43,412$              
9 5,260$        1,736$                 -$           50,409$              
10 5,537$        2,016$                 59,967$      117,930$            
11 5,997$        4,717$                 -$           128,643$            
12 6,355$        5,146$                 -$           140,144$            
13 6,355$        5,606$                 -$           152,104$            
14 6,464$        6,084$                 -$           164,653$            
15 6,908$        6,586$                 100,807$    278,954$            
16 7,561$        11,158$               -$           297,673$            
17 7,561$        11,907$               -$           317,140$            
18 7,783$        12,686$               -$           337,609$            
19 8,582$        13,504$               -$           359,695$            
20 8,813$        14,388$               -$           382,896$            
Total 116,170$    100,483$             166,243$    382,896$            
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The cash balance account values were converted into annuity payments to 
determine the annual cash flow generated by their values. As described in Chapter IV, the 
annuity calculation assumed a four percent interest rate and paid at the end of the year. 
The model used an annuity length of 22 years for an enlisted member because the 
member was assumed to retire at age 40 and then receive the old age annuity at age 62. 
Similarly, the model calculated an officer’s annuity for 19 years because it assumed 
retirement at age 43. The annuity calculations were based on account balances of 
$734,774 and $382,896 for an O-5 and an E-7, respectively. The second career annual 
annuities equated to $55,945 for the O-5 and $26,496 for the E-7. 
The old age annuity used the same values previously calculated for the current 
system and began at age 62. From Table 14, the old age annuities equaled $25,724 for an 
E-7 and $49,045 for an O-5. Table 17 summarizes the cash balance annuitized cash flow 
and old age annuity. 
 
Table 17.   Alternative System Annuities with Cash Balance Annuity 
Option 
As Table 17 shows, the annuitized cash balance value is greater for both an E-7 
and an O-5. Thus, the cash flow generated by the alternative system will surpass the 
current system’s benefit, and give the member a higher retirement income than the 
current system. An E-7’s second career income is three percent higher and an O-5’s 
income is 14 percent higher. The O-5’s larger benefit increase stems from annuitizing the 
cash balance account for three fewer years. 
The cash balance rollover option was calculated to grow at five percent until the 
retiree reached the old age annuity. For the O-5, the cash balance value at age 62 is 









these values from age 62 to 85 yielded annuity payments of $124,975 and $75,391, 
respectively. These values were then added to the old age annuity to generate the retiree’s 
cash flows. Table 18 summarizes these payments. 
  
Table 18.   Alternative System Annuities with Cash Balance Rollover 
Option 
The rollover option provides a larger benefit after the member leaves the labor 
force. With members’ preference for current compensation, however, it is expected that a 
majority of retirees will elect to take the annuity option. 
3. Department of Defense System 
The DOD system contained four income sources: a transition bonus, a second 
career annuity, an old age annuity, and a TSP account. The transition bonus and second 
career annuity provided the annual income from military retirement until age 65. Then, 
the old age annuity and TSP account provided a retiree’s annual income from age 65 until 
age 85. The transition bonus and TSP accounts were annuitized to provide the maximum 
annual cash flows during their respective periods.  
The transition bonus for E-7s and O-5s with 20 YOS amounted to 2.5 times their 
final basic pay. Using the 2014 basic pay table, these bonuses amounted to $146,889 for 
an E-7 and $252,666 for an O-5. It was assumed that the entire transition bonus amount 
was converted into an annuity. Due to the assumed difference in retirement age, an E-7’s 
annuity lasted 25 years (age 40 to 65) and an O-5’s annuity lasted 22 years (age 43 to 65). 
Assuming a four percent interest rate, the annuitized values equaled $9,403 and $17,848, 
respectively. If a member did not convert the full amount, the annuity would be less than 
calculated. 
Pay Grade
2nd Career Annuity 
(Retirement–62)





The DOD system caps the second career annuity at 25 percent of Hi-3 pay. The 
second career bonus was calculated by taking the current system’s annuity and dividing 
by two, which gave the equivalent of 25 percent of Hi-3 for a member retiring at 20 YOS. 
For an E-7 and O-5, these annuities equaled $12,862 and $24,523, respectively. 
Combining these annuities with the transition bonus annuities gave an annual retirement 
income during a member’s second career stage of $22,265 and $42,007, respectively. 
The TSP account provided an annual income from age 65 until age 85. The TSP 
contributions, however, were made during the member’s career and allowed to grow at 
five percent until age 65. This appreciated TSP account value gave the principal for the 
annuity. Beginning at two years of service, the five percent contribution gave an E-7 a 
TSP account value of $57,474 at 20 YOS. Similarly, an O-5’s TSP account attained a 
value of $107,509 at 20 YOS. Figure 6 shows the progressing value of each TSP account.  
 
Figure 6.  TSP Account Value during Military Career 
The TSP contributions ended at 20 YOS and growth was calculated at five 
percent annually. This growth led to an E-7’s TSP account being valued at $191,092 and 
an O-5’s TSP account being valued at $314,492. These two values provided the 
respective principals to calculate the annuities from age 65 to 85. Using a four percent 
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interest rate, the E-7’s annual annuity amounted to $14,061 and the O-5’s annual annuity 
equaled $23,141. 
The DOD system’s final component came from the same Hi-3 old age annuity as 
the other two systems. These annuities were $25,724 for an E-7 and $49,045 for an O-5. 
Combining the old age annuities with the annuitized TSP account provided the annual 
retiree income from age 65 to age 85. Thus, during old age, an E-7 retiree would have an 
annual income of $39,785 and an O-5 retiree would have an annual income of $72,186. 
Table 19 summarizes the DOD system’s components and annual cash flows. 
  
Table 19.   Summary of DOD System’s Components and Retirement 
Income 
4. Cash Flow Comparison 
The three systems provide three different undiscounted annual cash flows. The 
current system was used as the baseline to compare to the alternative and DOD systems. 
The alternative system provided a marginally higher annual retirement income during the 
second career stage and then the same income during the old age stage. The DOD system  
 
E-7/20
2nd Career Income 
(Retirement–65)
Old Age Income 
(65+)
Transition Bonus $9,403 $0
2nd Career Annuity $12,862 $0
TSP Annuity $0 $14,061
Old Age Annuity $0 $25,724
Total $22,265 $39,785
O-5/20
2nd Career Income 
(Retirement–65)
Old Age Income 
(65+)
Transition Bonus $17,484 $0
2nd Career Annuity $24,523 $0
TSP Annuity $0 $23,141
Old Age Annuity $0 $49,045
Total $42,007 $72,186
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offered a lower annual income during the second career stage and then a higher annual 
income during the old age stage. Table 20 compares the annual incomes for all three 
systems. 
 
Table 20.   Undiscounted Annual Income Summary for Each System 
The systems’ undiscounted cumulative lifetime earnings offer another method to 
compare the three systems. Adding the annual incomes from retirement to age 85 
provided this comparison. The current system generated a lifetime total income of 
$1,183,295 for the E-7 and $2,108,944 for the O-5. The alternative system provided 
marginally higher earnings, $1,200,282 and $2,240,034, respectively. The DOD system 
created the highest lifetime earnings with $1,392,092 and $2,440,057, respectively. Table 
21 summarizes the undiscounted lifetime earnings. 
 
Table 21.   Total Undiscounted Lifetime Retirement Earnings 
The DOD system generates the highest total undiscounted lifetime earnings of all 
three systems. It gives the E-7 a 17.6 percent increase and the O-5 a 15.7 percent increase  
 
E-7/20








Current System $25,724 $0 $25,724 $0
Alternative System $26,496 $772 $25,724 $0
DOD System $22,265 -$3,459 $39,785 $14,061
O-5/20








Current System $49,045 $0 $49,045 $0
Alternative System $55,945 $6,900 $49,045 $0
DOD System $42,007 -$7,038 $72,186 $23,141
System Current Alternative DOD
E-7/20* $1,183,295 $1,200,282 $1,392,092
O-5/20** $2,108,944 $2,240,034 $2,440,057
* Lifetime is age 40 to 85.
** Lifetime is age 43 to 85.
Lifetime Retirement Earnings
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in lifetime earnings compared to the current system. The alternative system provides a 
marginally higher benefit, 1.4 percent for the E-7 and 6.2 percent for the O-5, than the 
current system.  
The biggest difference in lifetime accumulation occurs with the benefit 
distributions’ timings. The DOD system provides a lower benefit during a retiree’s 
second career and then a higher benefit during old age, thus allowing the deferred benefit 
to grow in value. Conversely, by design, the alternative system distributes the retiree’s 
benefits more evenly through retirement, providing a consistent retirement income. 
Figures 7 and 8 show these distributions compared to the current system. 
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Figure 7.  Undiscounted Lifetime Earnings of Each System for an E-7 Retiring 
at 20 YOS 
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Figure 8.  Undiscounted Lifetime Earnings for an O-5 Retiring at 20 YOS 
As Figures 7 and 8 show, the alternative system provides a consistent retirement 
income that marginally surpasses the current system in total lifetime payments. The DOD 
system generates the highest total lifetime payments based on this analysis. The TSP 
annuity increases a retiree’s old age income and explains the increase in slope of the 
DOD system’s line at age 65. The TSP account growth, however, is susceptible to 
discount rates and is discussed in the next sections. 
Another comparison that can be made is to look at the indifference points between 
the systems. For this thesis, the lifetime earnings indifference point is the age at which 
the lifetime earnings are equal for two systems. For the O-5, the alternative system 
provides the highest lifetime earnings until age 77, when it is surpassed by the DOD 
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system. Thus, for the O-5, age 77 reflects the point at which both systems provide the 
same lifetime cumulative benefit. Based on lifetime earnings, the alternative system 
would be preferred until age 77, then the DOD system would be preferred after age 77. 
Similarly for the E-7, age 72 reflects the indifference point between the alternative and 
DOD systems. The indifference point between the DOD system and the current system is 
age 71 for both the E-7 and O-5. The alternative system always provides a higher benefit 
than the current system, so it is always preferred to the current system.    
C. PRESENT VALUE ANALYSIS 
To account for the time-value of money, a PV analysis was performed on the 
previously calculated cash flows. In a PV analysis, current compensation is discounted 
less than the deferred compensation because current compensation is valued higher than 
deferred compensation (current compensation can be invested to increase its real value 
over time). Consequently, the same payment made much farther in the future tends to be 
valued less than if it was made immediately. This section shows the results from PV 
calculations performed using the 5.5 percent discount rate described in Chapter IV. 
This analysis used the cash flows generated by each system and then discounted 
them to the 20 YOS retirement point. In this analysis, the system with the highest present 
value offers the most valuable system at the military retirement point. The alternative 
system (annuity option) yielded the highest PV for both the E-7 and O-5. The alternative 
system annuity option provided a 2.8 percent higher PV than the current system for the E-
7 and a 10.7 percent higher PV for the O-5. The DOD system offered almost the same PV 
as the current system, only yielding 0.2 and 0.5 percent increases for the E-7 and O-5, 
respectively. As an additional comparison, the alternative system’s rollover option was 
also investigated. The rollover option provided a lower PV than the current system for the 




Table 22.   Calculated Present Values for the Three Systems 
As shown in Table 22, the alternative system’s annuity option offers the highest 
value to the retiree, in PV terms. This is due to the alternative system’s consistent higher 
income during the second career period. Consequently, the earlier compensation gets 
discounted less than if it came later in retirement. While the DOD system gives the 
highest lifetime earnings shown in Table 21, the compensation deferred until later in life 
(i.e., TSP account) becomes highly affected by the discounting. The deferred 
compensation is not as valuable to the retiree because it comes much later in life. For an 
additional comparison, Appendix B shows the PV to the service member at each YOS for 
each system. 
D. COST COMPARISON 
To show that the alternative system is viable from a cost perspective, this section 
compares the alternative system’s cost to the current system’s cost. The alternative 
system provides the same benefit as the current system from age 62 until death. 
Consequently, those costs will be the same and were not included in this analysis. The 
alternative system’s cost savings comes from eliminating the second career annuity and 
moving a portion of that compensation earlier in members’ careers. The DOD Office of 
the Actuary’s Valuation of the Military Retirement System—September 30, 2011 was 
used to estimate the costs of both systems.  
The enlisted retiree (non-disability) cohort’s cost for retirees aged 40 to 61 was 
calculated to estimate the current system’s cost. This model assumed the old age annuity 
would begin at age 62 and did not include retirees in that age group. Similarly, the officer 
(non-disability) cohort included officer retirees from age 43 to age 61. The retirement 







E-7/20 $425,670 $437,578 $409,489 $426,721




year 2011, the military paid the enlisted cohort $12,261,466,793 and the officer cohort 
$6,131,601,448. The combined total outlays for non-disability retirees in these two 
cohorts equaled $18,393,068,241. 
As explained in Chapter IV, the alternative system used the military valuation 
report to determine the number of military members from military entry to 20 YOS. 
Combining this with the 2014 pay scale, the pay credit and bonus costs for this group of 
military members were estimated. The officer 15 percent pay credit and associated 
bonuses equaled to $2,907,163,779 and the enlisted pay credit and bonuses added to 
$5,082,160,306. Thus, the alternative system was estimated to cost $7,989,324,085, a 
56.6 percent cost decrease. Table 23 summarizes the previously described costs. 
 
Table 23.   Current and Alternative System Annual Outlay Comparison 
for Second Career Component 
The current system estimate includes some members qualifying for the Final 
Basic Pay retirement system. These members may skew the current system estimate 
higher than it would be if all members were under the Hi-3 system. Using this model’s 
age assumptions, the youngest enlisted retirees qualifying for the Final Basic Pay system 
would be age 54 in 2014 and only account for the enlisted cohort’s last seven years of the 
second career retirement period. Similarly, the youngest officer retirees would be age 57 
and would make up the officer cohort’s last four years. This upward skewing would not 
account for the approximate $10 billion annual difference between the two systems. 
Thus, the alternative system provides a system with a lower annual outlay requirement 
than the current system. 
Current System Alternative System
Officer 2nd Career 
Component
$6,131,601,448 $2,907,163,779 -$3,224,437,669 -52.6%
Enlisted 2nd 
Career Component
$12,261,466,793 $5,082,160,306 -$7,179,306,487 -58.6%




Additionally, non-vested members’ cash balance accounts would revert back to 
the pension trust. The annual total cash balance account for non-vested members leaving 
military service was estimated to be approximately $30 million. This figure does not 
include any interest earned by the account, only the pay credits contributed to it. While 
this value may be a small percentage compared to the overall annual outlay, these returns 
to the trust could accumulate to help offset any future liabilities.  
E. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
This section offers sensitivity analyses to show the effects of changing specific 
variables within the model. The sensitivity analyses include changing discount rates, pay 
credit and bonus sensitivity, and the alternative system’s effects on members serving 30 
years.  
1. Discount Rate Sensitivity 
The discount rate applied to the future cash flows does affect a retirement 
system’s PV. This section explores each system’s sensitivity to discount rates. The lowest 
discount rate, two percent, benefited the DOD system because the larger payments made 
in the old age period are discounted at a lower rate. As the discount rate increased, 
however, the DOD system’s PV dropped at a faster rate than the current and alternative 
systems’ PVs. The current and alternative systems were not affected as much by the 
changing discount rate because their cash flows are more evenly distributed throughout 
retirement. Figures 9 and 10 depict the retirement systems’ PV as a function of the 
applied discount rate. Appendix C shows the data tables used to create these figures. 
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Figure 9.  Present Value Sensitivity to Discount Rate for an E-7 Serving 20 
Years 
 
Figure 10.  Present Value Sensitivity to Discount Rate for an O-5 Serving 20 
Years 
Similar to the lifetime earnings indifference point, the alternative and DOD 
systems have a discount rate at which the PVs are equal. For the E-7, the indifference rate 
lies at 4.85 percent. At discount rates lower than 4.85 percent, the DOD system gives a 
higher PV, but at discount rates higher than 4.85 percent, the alternative system produces 
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the higher PV and would be preferred. Figure 9 shows this graphically as the point when 
the alternative and DOD systems’ lines cross at 4.85 percent. Similarly, the O-5’s 
indifference point lies at 2.6 percent and is graphically shown in Figure 10. Thus, in this 
model, a discount rate higher than 4.85 percent will give a higher PV for both officers 
and enlisted service members.  
While actual discount rates and personal discount rates vary, the present value 
analysis suggests that service members would always choose the alternative system to the 
DOD system. The 4.85 percent indifference rate falls below both the 5.5 percent discount 
rate used by the DOD Office of the Actuary (DOD, 2013) and the 18 percent personal 
discount rate suggested by Warner and Pleeter (2001). Thus, the alternative system 
provides the highest PV in both cases and would be preferred. As Figures 9 and 10 show, 
the alternative system always yields a higher PV than the current system and would also 
be preferred over the current system. 
2. 30 Years of Service Career 
The alternative system was analyzed from the perspective of an E-7 and an O-5 
retiring after 20 YOS. This section gives a brief overview for members serving until 30 
YOS. For this analysis, the E-7 was assumed to have promoted to E-9 and the O-5 
promoted to O-6. The pay credits and bonuses ceased at 20 YOS, but the cash balance 
account continued to accumulate interest credits at a four percent annual rate. Table 24 
shows the resulting annual cash flows generated by the alternative system compared to 
the current system under this retirement situation. 
 
Table 24.   Alternative System Compared to the Current System for 
Members Serving 30 Years 
E-9/30 2nd Career Income Old Age Income 
Current System $58,646 $58,646
Alternative System $60,392 $58,646
O-6/30 2nd Career Income Old Age Income 
Current System $95,164 $95,164
Alternative System $146,281 $95,164
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Table 24 confirms that members serving 30 years still earn an increasing 
retirement benefit with continued service. The retirement benefits increase for two 
reasons: the cash balance account earning interest and a smaller annuity period. First, the 
four percent annual return on the cash balance account over the extended 10-year period 
increases the cash balance account value by 48 percent. Second, the increased cash 
balance account value is then annuitized for 10 fewer years. Consequently, the annuitized 
cash balance account generates a higher annual income than the current system’s 75 
percent of Hi-3 pay. 
3. Pay Credit and Longevity Bonus 
Pay credit and longevity bonus value changes and their effect on the cash balance 
account were also investigated. The sensitivity analysis showed that increasing the pay 
credit by one percent had double the effect of increasing the longevity bonus by one 
month’s basic pay. A one percent increase in the pay credit increased the cash balance 
account’s value at 20 YOS by 2.8 percent. Similarly, increasing an individual longevity 
bonus increased the cash balance account value by 1.3 percent. Thus, changing the pay 
credit percentage affected the cumulative cash balance account value more than an 
increase to the longevity bonus. Decreases to the pay credit and longevity bonus also 
exhibited the same ratio.  
Interestingly, this sensitivity analysis found that changing one longevity bonus 
and keeping the other two constant yielded the same effect for all combinations. A one-
month increase at the sixth year longevity bonus yielded a 1.3 percent increase in the cash 
balance account’s value at 20 YOS. Likewise, increasing the longevity bonus at 10 YOS 
by one month’s pay also increased the cash balance account value by 1.3 percent. The 
same held true for the 15 YOS bonus as well.   
F. FINDINGS 
This chapter described the calculated results used to compare the three systems. 
The results show that the alternative system provides a higher annual income for the 
retiree during the second career phase and the same annual income during old age when 
compared to the current system. The DOD system generated the highest cumulative pay 
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total for a retiree living until age 72 (enlisted) or age 77 (officer). The alternative system, 
however, offered the highest PV due to the discount rate’s effect on the DOD system. 
Consequently, the alternative system offers an attractive and a potentially preferred 
system for the service member. 
Yet, for the alternative retirement system to be viable, it needs to address the 
criticisms described in Chapter II: cost, equity, force management, and civilian 
comparability. Viability cannot be solely based on benefit to the retiree. 
1. Cost 
The alternative system would save money by removing the current system’s 
second career-defined benefit and using a portion of that money to fund the annual cash 
balance system. Table 23 showed that the alternative system would cost approximately 
$8 billion annually to fund the cash balance component. The 2011 retirement system 
outlays for retirees in the second career phase approximately totaled $18.4 billion. Thus, 
the alternative system can provide a cost-effective alternative that reduces the overall 
military retirement system cost. 
Moving the second career  outlays earlier generated two effects. First, the basis 
used to calculate the benefit, basic pay, is lower during the member’s first years in 
service. In other words, an E-2 makes less in basic pay than an E-7. Consequently, the 
earned benefit during each YOS is less during a member’s early career and progressively 
gets higher until reaching 20 YOS. These earned benefits, however, are allowed to grow 
in value to generate an increased benefit at 20 YOS. The alternative does compensate a 
higher volume of service members because it includes those who will not serve the full 
20 years. The increased volume can increase the cost, but Table 23 shows that the 
alternative system can still save money. 
Second, the cash balance account reduces the future liability because it uses 
known quantities, the active-duty force and alternative system structure, to calculate the 
annual appropriations required to fund it. Thus, the DOD does not have to actuarially 
determine the future second career retirement benefits of currently serving members. The 
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second career benefits will be included in the annual appropriation. The old age annuity 
will still require actuarial analysis to estimate the future funding requirement. 
The pay credit and longevity bonus sensitivity analysis showed that changing the 
pay credit yields a larger long-term effect on the cash balance account value. 
Additionally, Tables 15 and 16 show that the longevity bonuses require higher 
cumulative outlays than the pay credits. These two trends indicate that altering the pay 
credit offers the most cost-effective change, should it be required. At the extreme, raising 
the pay credit and eliminating the bonuses would require the lowest annual outlays, but as 
will be discussed in a later section, this would not offer any force management tools to 
retain the desired force. Thus, the bonuses were included in the alternative system. 
2. Equity 
As mentioned in Chapter II, O’Hanlon (2011) described the current system as 
being too generous to those serving 20 years but not generous enough to those not 
serving the full 20 years. The alternative system answers this equity criticism by 
providing a retirement benefit for members who serve at least six years. The alternative 
system’s design provides a larger retirement benefit similar benefit to what is found in the 
private sector. Chapter III found that the most prevalent private sector systems only 
match six percent of annual earnings and require employee contributions to earn the 
employer matching contributions. The alternative system contributes 15 percent of 
income for all service members and does not require service member matching 
contributions. Thus, it provides a larger benefit than private sector retirement plans.  
While the 20 YOS retirees still retain a slightly better benefit with the alternative 
system, members serving less than that also earn a benefit. Chapter III described the 
Defense Business Board’s (2011) plan to create a defined contribution system. This 
system proposed making higher contributions for members in hardship situations such as 
combat or deployment. The alternative system has a contribution that compensates for 
these situations and other intangible situations such as the inability to build equity in a 
home or a spouse’s hindered career. As Tables 15 and 16 show, service members, 
especially those serving more than 10 years, can leave military service with a benefit that 
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reflects their sacrifices. To answer O’Hanlon’s critique, the alternative system now gives 
a generous benefit to those serving at least six years. 
3. Force Management 
The cash balance account offers both a recruitment and retention tool for force 
management. As described in the previous section, the retirement benefit serves as a 
powerful recruitment tool because it offers a better benefit than normally found in the 
private sector. This benefit makes military service competitive with private sector 
compensation.  
With an earlier vesting point and the longevity bonuses, service members are 
offered additional benefits to remain in military service. In the current system, a member 
with 6 YOS still requires 14 years to earn a benefit. This timespan creates a long-term 
reward for continued service and is subject to personal discounting by the individual 
service member. In the alternative system, the first, and smallest, longevity bonus gives a 
small reward to service members serving a second tour. The 10 YOS and 15 YOS 
bonuses, however, give much higher rewards for continued service, as can be seen in 
Tables 15 and 16. These incremental bonuses give near-term compensation rewards to 
service members that incentivize retention and are subject to less individual personal 
discounting. In essence, the bonuses act as a bread trail to lead service members to a full 
career. 
The DOD system proposed using a continuation bonus that varies by skill and 
position to retain the “right people.” The current military compensation system already 
gives certain bonuses, like selective reenlistment bonuses (SRB) and the Navy’s Aviation 
Career Continuation Pay (ACCP) bonus, to retain the “right people.” The DOD’s 
continuation bonus acts more as a compensation bonus than as part of a retirement 
system. The alternative system’s longevity bonuses are actual retirement bonuses that can 
be added to the existing bonus compensation system. This provides an alternate system to 
retain the “right people” with the “right skills” because it provides a broad incentive to 
remain on active duty and then rewards specific positions with specific bonuses. 
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Lastly, the current retirement system reduces a commander’s reluctance to 
remove subpar performers who may be late in their careers. Chapter II noted that 
commanders were hesitant to separate subpar members with 15 YOS because the 
members would lose their retirement benefits. From Tables 15 and 16, the alternative 
system would give $164,653 to a separated enlisted member with 15 YOS and an officer 
would receive $322,696. These figures assume the subpar member did not receive the 15 
YOS longevity bonus. As shown, members separated for poor performance during the 
latter portion of their careers would still receive a benefit. Thus, the alternative system 
may decrease a commander’s reluctance to remove these members.  
4. Civilian Comparability 
Being derived from private sector retirement plans, the alternative system 
achieves civilian comparability. The cash balance component provides a portable 
retirement benefit that can easily be moved from the military to a private sector 
employer. The vested cash balance account’s lump-sum value offers an easily 
transferrable benefit to the service member. The cash balance value can be rolled into a 
future employer’s retirement plan or it can be placed into an individual retirement 
account. This portability offers an attractive benefit to potential recruits who may not 
want to serve 20 years, but would like to serve a shorter time. 
Cash balance accounts also offer an easily recognized value as the contributions 
and account value grows. Much like a private sector employee’s monthly pay stub, the 
member’s leave and earnings statement (LES) could report the monthly contribution 
made into the cash balance account and also the account’s accumulated value. 
Alternatively, the cash balance trust could set up an electronic database that members 
could view online, like the current Thrift Savings Plan (TSP). Both of these methods 
allow members to view their retirement compensation similar to private sector 
employees. Additionally, these methods would allow members to recognize their deferred 
benefits as if they were current compensation, unlike the current system.  
The cash balance component utilizes another benefit found in the private sector 
because it does not cap the contribution that can be made into it. The Internal Revenue 
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Service caps the tax-deferred contributions that can be made into a defined contribution 
system, such as the TSP, at $17,500. Company contributions into a defined benefit plan 
are capped at $210,000, 1,100 percent higher than the $17,500 limit. Thus, the longevity 
bonuses would not be subject to these contribution limits and could remain in a tax-
deferred status. (Internal Revenue Service, 2013) 
One alternative system aspect that does not fully satisfy civilian comparability lies 
with a member’s choice of investments. The cash balance retirement trust managers 
determine the investments made on behalf of the service members. Chapter III, however, 
found that many employees do not fully understand financial investing and management. 
Thus, the cash balance component provides a paternalistic control on the military 
retirement system that guarantees a specific return to all service members, some of whom 
may not fully understand these retirement choices. The alternative system does provide a 
limited choice for 20 YOS retirees through the annuity or rollover options. 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter established that the alternative system offers a viable modification to 
modernize the retirement system. It showed that the alternative system provides a larger 
benefit than the current system and also a higher PV than the DOD system. The 
alternative system also gives members with 30 YOS careers an increasing benefit that 
surpasses the current system’s benefit. Finally, the chapter showed that the alternative 
system answers the cost, equity, force management, and civilian comparability criticisms 
that plague the current military retirement system. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The military retirement system’s rising cost presents an obvious target for cost 
reduction in 2014’s fiscally constrained environment. Yet, a number of reform 
commissions and proposals dating to 1948 have been unable to create lasting change to 
modernize to the system. An alternative to modernize the retirement system while 
reducing the cost was proposed in this thesis. The proposed alternative system 
incorporates a cash balance component to modernize the military retirement system. 
The alternative system was designed to be faithful to service members by 
providing the same retirement benefit as the current system. The cash balance system 
achieves this goal by providing 1.4 percent higher lifetime earnings for an E-7 retiring 
after 20 YOS and giving an O-5 retiring at 20 YOS 6.4 percent higher lifetime earnings. 
Additionally, the alternative cash balance system yielded a higher present value than both 
the current system and a Department of Defense (DOD)-proposed system for any 
discount rate above 4.85 percent. Thus, military retirees are likely to prefer the proposed 
cash balance alternative over either the current system or the DOD system. 
The alternative system also answered the current system’s four primary criticisms: 
cost, equity, force management, and civilian comparability. The cash balance 
contributions cost less than the current outlays for the second career component. The 
early vesting gives members serving at least six years some retirement benefit. The 15 
percent pay credit and longevity bonuses offer recruitment and retention incentives. 
Finally, the vested cash balance account provides a portable retirement benefit that can be 
rolled into another retirement plan or individual retirement account. 
The cash balance component allows the DOD to utilize a modernized retirement 
system that provides a conservative approach to retirement. Being a defined benefit 
system, service members are guaranteed specific retirement benefits, regardless of stock 
and bond market volatility. By making the contributions to a managed retirement trust, 
the DOD compensates for the limited financial knowledge of some potential retirees. 
While this may not be desirable to some potential retirees, the managed trust protects the 
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members who may not have investment knowledge. Ultimately, the 20 YOS retirees will 
still receive the same benefit as they would under the current system. 
A. MAIN FINDINGS 
This thesis showed that incorporating a cash balance component into a military 
retirement system offers a viable alternative to reform and modernize the current system. 
Specifically, the findings in this thesis are: 
 The annuitized cash balance generated a higher retirement income during 
the second career phase when using a 15 percent pay credit, 4 percent 
interest credit, and longevity bonuses at 6, 10, and 15 YOS. 
 The annual outlays required by the cash balance component would cost 
less than the current system’s outlays during the second career retirement 
phase. 
 The alternative system yielded a higher present value than both the current 
system and the DOD system for any discount rate above 4.85 percent. 
 The DOD system is highly sensitive to the applied discount rate due to the 
TSP account’s deferral until old age. 
 The alternative system provides a higher second career retirement income 
for 30 YOS retirees. 
 Changing the pay credit yields a more cost-effective alteration than 
changing the longevity bonus. 
 The non-matching 15 percent pay credit offers a higher retirement benefit 
than most private sector plans that match up to six percent. 
 The cash balance component allows an 1,100 percent higher tax-deferred 
contribution than a defined contribution plan. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
The viability of incorporating a cash balance component into retirement reform 
and modernization was investigated in this thesis. As such, it analyzed the effect on a 
retiree’s income and total system cost, assuming 100 percent of retirees fall under the 
system. The thesis suggested positive effects to recruitment and retention. To further 
understand a cash balance component’s effect on the military retirement system, 
continued research should address the following areas: 
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 Alternative system’s effect on recruitment 
 Alternative system’s effect on retention 
 Optimal longevity bonus schedule and amounts from a force management 
perspective 
 Potential unfunded liability due to the interest credit during down stock 
and bond markets 
 Conversion cost to switch to the alternative system 
 Cash balance retirement trust’s annual management cost 




APPENDIX A. PLAN TYPE COMPARISONS  
In Tables 25 to 28, Wells Fargo (2012, p. 5–8) compared traditional defined 
benefit plans to both cash balance plans and defined contribution plans. 
 
Table 25.   Traditional and Cash Balance Defined Benefit Plans 
Compared to a Defined Contribution Plan 
(from Wells Fargo, 2012, p. 5–8) 
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Table 26.   Traditional and Cash Balance Defined Benefit Plans 
Compared to a Defined Contribution Plan 
(from Wells Fargo, 2012, p. 5–8) 
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Table 27.   Traditional and Cash Balance Defined Benefit Plans 
Compared to a Defined Contribution Plan 
(from Wells Fargo, 2012, p. 5–8) 
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Table 28.   Traditional and Cash Balance Defined Benefit Plans 
Compared to a Defined Contribution Plan 
(from Wells Fargo, 2012, p. 5–8) 
 93 
APPENDIX B. PRESENT VALUE AT EACH YEAR OF SERVICE 
 
Figure 11.  Present Value at Each Year of Service for an E-7 Retiring with 20 
Years of Service: Current, Alternative Annuity, and DOD Systems 
 
Figure 12.  Present Value at Each Year of Service for an O-5 Retiring with 20 
Years of Service: Current, Alternative Annuity, and DOD Systems 
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APPENDIX C. DISCOUNT RATE SENSITIVITY TABLES 
 
Table 29.   Present Value Sensitivity to Discount Rate for an E-7 
Serving 20 Years 
 
Table 30.   Present Value Sensitivity to Discount Rate for an O-5 
Serving 20 Years 
Discount Rate Current Alternative DOD
2.0% 758,599$   782,579$   856,263$   
3.0% 630,714$   649,625$   687,036$   
4.0% 532,998$   548,391$   561,787$   
5.0% 457,217$   470,107$   467,733$   
6.0% 397,583$   408,644$   396,061$   
7.0% 349,986$   359,671$   340,634$   
8.0% 311,474$   320,097$   297,138$   
9.0% 279,906$   287,685$   262,509$   
10.0% 253,709$   260,803$   234,551$   
11.0% 231,718$   238,242$   211,673$   
12.0% 213,058$   219,101$   192,710$   
13.0% 197,067$   202,696$   176,799$   
14.0% 183,236$   188,505$   163,297$   
15.0% 171,174$   176,125$   151,718$   
16.0% 160,572$   165,241$   141,691$   
17.0% 151,187$   155,604$   132,929$   
18.0% 142,827$   147,017$   125,211$   
System Present Value
Discount Rate Current Alternative DOD
2.0% 1,384,781$  1,513,886$  1,547,012$  
3.0% 1,162,438$  1,275,024$  1,258,203$  
4.0% 990,008$     1,089,707$  1,040,256$  
5.0% 854,525$     943,925$     873,684$     
6.0% 746,691$     827,680$     744,736$     
7.0% 659,778$     733,762$     643,629$     
8.0% 588,871$     656,923$     563,337$     
9.0% 530,344$     593,301$     498,773$     
10.0% 481,496$     540,024$     446,217$     
11.0% 440,298$     494,937$     402,926$     
12.0% 405,208$     456,404$     366,861$     
13.0% 375,046$     423,170$     336,489$     
14.0% 348,896$     394,265$     310,648$     
15.0% 326,045$     368,930$     288,450$     
16.0% 305,931$     346,565$     269,209$     
17.0% 288,106$     326,694$     252,393$     
18.0% 272,213$     308,932$     237,582$     
System Present Value
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